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I. DID THE BOARD HAVE STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO ENACT THE 
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SERVICE/FOOD ESTABLISHMENT LICENSING FEE STANDARDS BE 
SUPPORTED BY SOME EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE PUBLIC 
HEARING? 
REFERENCES TO REPORTS OF 
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
This case has been reported at 103 Utah Adv. Rep. 31. 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This Petition arises out of the Order and Written Opinion of 
the Utah Court of Appeals entered on March 10, 1989, reversing 
the earlier Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court. The 
Opinion was written by the Hon. Norman H. Jackson and concurred 
in by the other memoers of the panel hearing the matter, the Hon. 
Richard C. Davidson, and the Hon. Russell W. Bench. Jurisdiction 
to review that decision by a Writ of Certiorari to this Court is 
conferred by Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-2A-2 (3) (a) (1988) and Rules 
42 through 48, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS 
The controlling provisions of constitutions, statutes, 
ordinances and regulations that the case involves are set forth 
in full in plaintiffs' addendum to this Brief and include Utah 
Code Ann. Sees. 26-24-14, 26-24-18 and 26-24-20 from the Local 
1 
Board of Health Act, together with Utah Code Ann. Sec. 26-1-6 and 
Sec. 10-8-80. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves an action for declaratory judgment 
brought by plaintiffs-respondents (hereinafter referred to as 
"plaintiffs") in the Third District Court of Salt Lake County to 
determine the validity of certain "fees" imposed by the Salt Lake 
City-County Board of Health (hereinafter referred to as the 
"Board") pursuant to a certain "Food Service/Food Establishment 
Licensing Fee Standard" adopted by the Board. The respective 
parties entered into a Stipulation of Facts and Issues for 
Determination (hereinafter referred to as the "Stipulation") 
together with various Exhibits, which was submitted to the Court. 
Each party submitted its respective Motion for Summary Judgment 
and Memoranda in support of its Motion and in opposition to the 
opposing Motion, seeking the Court's determination based upon 
those facts and documents. The Court issued its Ruling in the 
form of a minute entry on June 24, 1987 (R. 166-167), and after 
various objections were heard and resolved, the Court entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 191-197) and Judgment 
(R. 198-200) on August 18, 1987. The Board appealed the District 
Court's decision to this Court, which transferred the case to the 
Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-2A-3 (2) (h) 
(1986). The Court of Appeals, after hearing the matter, entered 
its Order and Opinion, reversing the Judgment of the District 
Court. In view of their central importance to the resolution of 
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this matter, the Stipulation and its attached Exhibits, as well 
as the District Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Judgment, and the Circuit Court's Order and Opinion, are 
attached hereto as portions of the addendum to this Brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACT^ 
This case was presented to the Court upon a Stipulation of 
Facts and Issues for Determination (R. 46). The Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law by the Board (R. 73-74) were included as 
Exhibits to tne Stipulation, While stipulating that those 
Findings were entered, however, plaintiffs have emphasized 
throughout this action that no evidence supporting any of the 
dollar costs of the food inspection program or amounts to be 
produced from the license fees were ever presented upon the 
record, except through the Board's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law themselves. The only items of testimony, 
documents, papers, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, or 
Orders of the Board regarding the proposal for the adoption of 
the licensing fee standard were reflected in the Exhibits 
attached to the Stipulation (R. 49, Para. 7). Those Exhibits 
accurately reflected the times, places, and purposes, as well as 
all actions taken, comments made, and other input given at the 
public hearing. The Board is a non-elected body appointed by the 
Salt Lake City and County Commissioners to act as a local board 
of health. At a June 1986 meeting, the Board discussed reviving 
a plan to initiate an inspection fee to be paid by "food service/ 
food establishment" businesses. Staff members presented 
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information about inspection fee classifications and schedules in 
several nearby states and estimated the health department was 
spending $600,000.00 to inspect food establishments at least 
twice yearly as required by the Utah State Food Service 
Regulations. The Board voted to hold a public hearing on the 
proposal and a fee schedule or "fee standard" was drafted. 
(Court of Appeals Opinion, p. 2). The licensing fee standard 
established fee categories and fee amounts ranging from $15.00 to 
$100.00 per year, based upon factors including the number of 
service baysf the number of seats, the number of square feet in 
the establishment, and whether it was a food service/food 
establishment, a day care center, or a nursing home. (R. 55-59). 
The inspections contemplated in the standard constituted no 
change from previously conducted inspections, except that those 
inspections were paid with Health Department funds (R. 49, Para. 
8). 
Following that determination, due and proper notice of a 
public hearing on the licensing fee standard was given by the 
Board (R. 53-54) and a public hearing was conducted on September 
10, 1986, by a Board-appointed hearing officer from the Health 
Department (R. 60-65). A copy of the proposed Standard was made 
available as part of the Notice to the public by the Board prior 
to that public hearing (R. 55-59). Approximately thirty persons 
attended the public hearing. No member of the Board or the local 
health department was present, other than the hearing officer. 
An that public hearing, all of the testimony and comments were 
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adverse to the adoption of the proposed licensing fee standard. 
No testimony nor evidence of any sort was presented by the Board, 
the department, nor its hearing officer in support of the 
adoption of that standard (R. 60-65) or showing the basis for the 
food establishment categories or fee amounts set forth in the 
proposed inspection fee schedule (Court of Appeals Opinion, p. 
2). Persons attending the meeting were informed that a summary 
of the hearing and written comments would be submitted to the 
Board before its regular meeting on October 2, 1986, and that 
interested parties could attend that meeting and make additional 
comments before the Board if they desired. The Board then 
prepared a draft of its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order (Court of Appeals Opinion, p. 2). 
The meeting held on October 2, 1986, was a regular meeting 
of the Board and not a "public hearing" Within the meaning of 
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 26-24-20 (1981). The required notice for 
such a "public hearing" was not published regarding that meeting. 
At that time, the Board had before it a summary of the comments 
from the earlier public hearing, written comments from the public 
and Health Department staff prepared subsequent to the public 
hearing responding to the criticism of the proposed standard made 
at the public hearing (R. 75-79), and proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law (R. 73-74), as well as the licensing fee 
standard. Further oral comments were incited from the private 
parties and staff in attendance. At the conclusion of the 
hearing, the Board voted to implement the licensing fee standard, 
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whereupon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order 
previously drafted by the Board were executed (Draft of Record of 
Board Meeting, R. 66-72). 
The Board's determination that the dollar amounts, categor-
ies and definitions were reasonable was based upon the recommend-
ations of that staff and the board's own deliberations, without 
any public input in regard to those dollar amounts, categories or 
definitions (R. 50, Para. 10). 
Following the adoption of the licensing fee standard, 
plaintiffs filed this action for a declaratory judgment to 
determine the validity of the licensing fee standard. The 
District Court concluded that the Board did not have the 
authority to impose charges as specified in the "Food 
Service/Food Establishment Licensing Fee Standards", that the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as adopted by the Board 
were unsupported by the evidence, and that the provisions of the 
"Food Service/Food Establishment Licensing Fee Standards" 
amounted to a tax which the Board had no power to impose and, 
based upon those determinations, that the standard imposing the 
charges was invalid and null and void ab initio and the Board 
should be restrained from assessing any further charges pursuant 
to those standards. (R. 197-198) 
The Court of Appeals reversed that decision on each basis, 
holding, in its opinion: (1) that the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law as adopted by the Board did not have to be 
supported by evidence upon the record at the public hearing 
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because it was only a rulemaking hearing, not bound by the 
limitations of an administrative adjudicative hearing, and that 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law could properly be 
based upon any information secured by the board, formally or 
informally; (2) that the Board had statutory power under Utah 
Code Ann. 26-24-14 (14) et. seq. to impose fees to defray costs 
of the local health department program; and (3) that the charges 
imposed under the fee standard constituted "fees" and not "taxes" 
because they were designed to actually defray some or all of the 
costs of inspecting the food service establishments on which they 
were imposed and there was some assurance that the money 
collected would actually be used to defray those costs since the 
funds were to be deposited into an account of the health fund and 
funding to support the food inspection program was to be drawn 
from that account. 
ARGUMENT FOR ISSUANCE Of WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
INTRODUCTION 
The three issues presented to the District Court and 
subsequently determined by the Court of Appeals are issues of 
substantial significance to this state far beyond the specific 
controversy involved in this action. Th^ facts and issues in the 
case were based upon written stipulation?, allowing this Court to 
render its own interpretation of those facts and determinations 
of applicable law, as did the Circuit Coiirt of Appeals. 
The Third Judicial District Court has not been alone in its 
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interpretation regarding these issues. The Davis County District 
Court reached similar conclusions in its decision reviewed by 
this Court in Utah Restaurant Association v. Davis County Board 
of Health, 709 P. 2d 1159 (Utah, 1985). This Court's decision in 
that case, unfortunately, did not need to reach those issues due 
to the determination that there had been no Findings of Fact or 
Conclusions of Law entered as required by the Statute, which 
defect was adequate to resolve the case. In its decision, 
however, this Court did discuss some of the factors for 
determination of whether a "fee" is really a "fee" or a tax in 
the context of that case and further explained, albeit also that 
should a similar fee regulation be attempted by the board in the 
future, it would be "well advised to do so in careful compliance 
with the procedures required by the Local Health Department 
Act.". Utah Restaurant Association, supra, at 1161. 
The proper interpretation of such rights and statutes as 
embodied in the three issues in this case are becoming more and 
more important to the populace and the non-elected bodies with 
governing powers over them. The utilization of "user fees" and 
"license fees" by local boards and non-elected bodies is becoming 
a popular tool for securing increased revenue in various areas of 
our society, as elected officials "tighten their belts" in order 
to reduce taxes. As elected officials limit funds available for 
previous programs, the local non-elected bodies are attempting to 
override the lack of funding for those programs by finding other 
sources of funding and, in this case, the local boards of health 
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see the assessment of "fees" for their services as their 
alternative. When these "fees" are charged for services 
requested by the party charged, such as preparation of 
certificates, copying fees, or fees for use of swimming, golfing, 
or similar voluntary facilities, such as have been normally 
charged in the past, they are truly fees not affected by the 
issues in this case. however, as available tax funds have been 
further restricted, these non-elected bodies are now seeking to 
expand into programs established for the benefit of the general 
public, and which are not requested by the person being charged, 
such as the fees imposed in this case in regard to the board's 
food inspection program. The local boards of health, as well as 
other non-elected bodies throughout this state, are closely 
watching the progress of this case, as they did the previous Utah 
Restaurant Association vs. Davis County Board of Health case for 
guidance as to what approaches they may properly take, and the 
manner in which they may proceed, if at $11, for the imposition 
of such "fees" as a means of dealing with these reductions in 
funding. For these reasons, it is submitted that each of the 
questions involved in this case, as hereinafter discussed, 
constitute important questions regarding municipal and state law 
which have not been, but should be, settled by this Court. 
POINT I 
DID THE BOARD HAVE STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO ENACT 
THE FEE SCHEDULE EMBODIED IN ITS FOOD SERVICE/ 
FOOD ESTABLISHMENT LICENSING EJEE STANDARDS? 
Absent statutory authority to impose such licensing fees, 
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the Board has no inherent power to charge any fees. Utah 
Restaurant Association v. Davis County Board of Health, Supra. 
The only statutory authority for the imposition of the licensing 
fees attempted to be imposed by the defendant is that generalized 
language of Utah Code Ann. Sec. 26-24-14 (14) (1981), et seq., 
regarding powers and duties of local health departments, to, 
"(14) Establish and collect appropriate fees, to accept, use and 
administer all federal, state or private donations or grants of 
funds, . . . " That lack of authority appears particularly 
blatant when considered in light of the provisions regarding the 
State Health Department's specific statutory authority to adopt a 
"schedule of fees that may be assessed for services", which is 
subject to the statutory restrictions that such fees must be 
"reasonable and fair" and must further be "submitted to and 
approved by the legislature as part of the department's annual 
appropriations request . . .", Utah Code Ann. Sec. 26-1-6 (1981). 
It would not seera, under those circumstances, that the 
legislature could oe said to have intended to grant authority for 
the defendant to impose unrestricted licensing fees as sought to 
be imposed in this matter. 
While cases such as Provo City v. Provo Meat Packing 
Company, 49 Utah 528, 165 P. 477 (1917), Best Foods v. 
Christensen, 75 Utah 392, 285 P. 1001 (1930) and Salt Lake City 
v. Bennion Gas & Coal Co., 15 P. 2d 648 (Utah 1932) have found 
that the power to impose a "license fee or a license tax" is 
within the police powers of the state to regulate or prohibit a 
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business and that inherent in those powets is the power to tax 
for the cost of such regulation, those cases arose out of the 
taxing powers of the governing body, which the Board does not 
possess. Even for counties, the right to conduct inspections has 
been said to imply no right to tax merel^ for revenue. See 
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph go. v. Salt Lake County, 
702 P. 2d 113 (Utah 1985) and Consolidated Coal Company v. Emery 
County, 702 P. 2d 121 (Utah 1985). Thus, the granting of the 
power to the Board to adopt rules, regulations and standards and 
to conduct health inspections does not imply such power to impose 
fees to cover the costs of their services. This is particularly 
so where the legislature has statutorily provided other methods 
of financing those inspections through appropriations from the 
general fund, the levy of a tax or from local, state or federal 
funds, as provided by Utah Code Ann. Sec. 26-24-16 (1987). See 
Hill v. City of Eureka, 35 C.A. 2d 154, 94 P. 2d 1025 (1939). 
If the lack of authority to impose such fees creates 
hardships upon such non-elected bodies, they may properly take 
their concerns to the elected governing bodies or seek redress 
from the legislature. As this Court explained in Consolidated 
Coal, supra, in invalidating fees imposed by the county: 
. . . (I)f it is necessary or desirable for counties to 
raise revenues through licensing taxes, some limits 
should exist to prevent some inequitable distributions 
of the tax burden among a few businesses. The 
Legislature is better equipped to devise such 
limitations and to accommodate the competing interests 
of counties and local businesses than the courts. 
702 P. 2d at 126. 
Under these circumstances, the District Court properly 
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determined that board did not have statutory authority to enact 
the tee schedule embodied in its food service/food establishment 
licensing fee standards and therefor determined that they were 
invalid and void ab initio. It is further respectfully submitted 
that the decision by the Court of Appeals reversing the decision 
of the District Court involves an important question of municipal 
and state law which has not been, but should bef settled by this 
Court for the reasons set forth at the beginning of this 
Argument. 
POINT II 
DOES THE LICENSING FEE STANDARD AS IMPOSED BY 
THE BOARD CONSTITUTE A TAX RATHER THAN A FEE? 
The licensing fee standard is a revenue raising measure with no 
reasonable relationship to the cost of any increased service. 
The parties stipulated that the services rendered to the food 
establishments would not be increased as a result of the fee 
standard. It provides no "demonstrable benefit" to the food 
establishments. Rather, it merely continues inspections which 
were previously conducted without the imposition of such fees. 
A series of cases by this Court have considered the issue of 
"impact fees" as "taxes" in connection with subdivision 
developments. Weber Basin Home Builders v. Roy City, 26 Utah 2d 
215, 487 P. 2d 866 (1971) held that the increased fees were 
impermissible where the increase in fees: 
". . .admittedly had no relationship to increased costs of 
the service rendered; and more importantly, where the 
declared purpose was to raise general revenue for the city, 
. . . the increase placed a disproportionate and unfair 
burden on new households . . . " 487 P. 2d at 867. 
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Banberry Development Corp, v. South Jordan City, 631 P. 2d 
899 (Utah 1981), directed that, in order to justify the 
imposition of such a fee, the benefit provided did not need to 
accrue solely to the person paying the fee but "the benefits 
derived from the exaction must be of some demonstrable benefit" 
to the party upon which the fee was imposed and it must bear some 
reasonable relationship to the need created by the applicant. To 
a similar effect was Call v. City of West Jordan, 606 P. 2d 271 
(Utah 1979), on reh. 614 P. 2d 1257 (Utah 1980). 
Lafferty v. Payson City, 642 P. 2d 375 (Utah 1982), 
distinguished valid "fees from invalid "taxes" based on the 
principle that, "A reasonable charge for a specific service is 
permissible, whereas a general fee that amounts to a revenue 
measure is not." Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Farmington 
City, 599 P. 2d 1242 (Utah 1979) found it to constitute an abuse 
of the taxing power when such "fees" were imposed upon a business 
for the benefit of the community as a whole, even when coupled 
with "vague promises of improved serviced" which the business, to 
a large extent, did not need. Smith v. Carbon County, 90 Utah 
560, 63 P. 2d 259, 263 (1953), found that where fees are charged 
for services in probate proceedings, "th$ amount of fees that may 
be exacted must bear some reasonable relation to the extent and 
nature of the services rendered. Otherwise such fees are, in 
contemplation of law, taxes." Similarly, Cache County v. 
Jensen, 21 Utah 207, 61 P. 303 (1900), explained: 
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"Neither the constitution nor the statute authorizes 
• . . ordinances . . . to tax citizens arbitrarily and 
unjustly, by license which confers no privilege that 
was not previously enjoyed, and which has no view to 
regulation." 61 P. at 304. 
In National Cable Television Association v. United States, 
94 S. Ct. 1146, 415 U. S. 336, 39 L. Ed. 2d 370 (1974), the Court 
found tnat a fee schedule established by a non-elected body (rhe 
FCC) for CATV systems which was based on the annual direct and 
indirect costs for CATV regulation was not appropriate where it 
failed to take into consideration the costs which inured to the 
benefit of the public. The Court explained that, unlike a tax: 
A fee . . . is incident to a voluntary act, e. g., a 
request that a public agency permit an applicant to practice 
law or medicine or construct a house or run a broadcast 
station. The public agency performing those services 
normally may exact a fee for a grant which, presumably, 
bestows a benefit on the applicant, not shared by other 
members of society. * * * If assessments are made by the 
Commission which are sufficient to recoup costs to the 
Commission for its oversight, the CATV's and other 
broadcasters would be paying not only for benefits they 
received but for the protective services rendered the 
public by the Commission. 415 U. S. 337-338. 
In the present case, the local board's main function is 
similarly to safeguard the public interest and health. By 
imposing a portion of the costs of its operations upon the food 
establishments, those establishments are forced to pay for the 
protective services rendered to the public by the Board. 
However, unlike the CATV operators, the food establishments have 
not even sought licenses from the Board to operate but have 
already obtained business licenses allowing their operation. 
Under these circumstances, the District Court properly 
determined that the charges embodied in the fee standard amounted 
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the standards were invalid and void ab initio for those reasons. 
It is further respectfully submitted that the decision by the 
Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the District Court 
involves an important question of municipal and state law which 
has not been, but should be, settled by this Court for the 
reasons set forth at the beginning of this Argument. 
POINT III 
MUST THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW BY THE 
BOARD IN SUPPORT OF ITS ADOPTION OF ITS FOOD SERVICE/ 
FOOD ESTABLISHMENT LICENSING FEE STANDARDS BE SUPPORTED 
BY SOME EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE PUBLIC HEARING? 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as adopted by the 
Board are statutorily mandated by Utah Code Ann. Sec. 26-24-20 
(1981), without which the fee schedule could not be properly 
promulgated. Utah Restaurant Association v. Davis County Board 
of Health, supra. Where such Findings and Conclusions are 
mandated, such as in courts or adjudicatory proceedings, they 
must have some support in the record, or the mandate serves no 
purpose. They must show that the Judgment or Order "follows 
logically from, and is supportable by, the evidence." Smith v. 
Smith, 726 P. 2d 423, 426 (Utah 1986). There is no support for 
the Findings of the Board from the record of the public hearing 
on September 10, 1986. The meeting of the Board on October 2, 
1986, was not such a mandated "public hearing". The Board, in 
adopting the licensing fee standard, relied solely on staff input 
and on its own personal judgment, neither of which was produced 
at the public hearing. There is no evidence or information in 
the record supporting: the various categories of the licensing 
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the record supporting: the various categories of the licensing 
fee standard; the various criteria on which the fee is based; the 
actual costs of inspections as opposed to other food service 
programs; the proportionate benefit from the inspection program 
to the public in general; the increased benefits to be received 
by the restaurants and food establishments; the amounts which 
would be produced by such inspections; the rationale behind 
having one-third of the cost of the entire program borne by 
inspection fees; or the means of dedicating funds obtained for 
the purpose of the inspection program to insure that the funding 
obtained from the program could not be used for other Board 
operations or fooa service programs• 
These issues, together with other vital issues, should have 
been fully and completely considered by the Board at the public 
hearing. The public should have been given an opportunity to 
provide input and ask questions regarding the imposition of the 
fee standards. The Board satisfied neither the letter nor the 
spirit of the law nor of this Court's decision in Utah Restaurant 
Association v. Davis County Board of Health, in holding a public 
hearing but basing its Findings and Conclusions on evidence 
submitted by Board members and staff prior to the hearing and 
that was not submitted to public review. 
Findings of Fact, supported upon the record of a public 
hearing, serve a two-fold purpose. They establish the basis for 
the Order and assure the public an effective opportunity for 
determining the accuracy of input, rebutting inaccurate input, 
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verifying presentations, and explaining concerns regarding the 
bases alleged as support for such order. They also provide the 
basis for meeting previous Utah Supreme Court pronouncements that 
an administrative body must disclose the bases of its 
calculations to persons challenging the reasonableness of fees, 
so that compliance with the various statutory and constitutional 
standards can be ascertained by a reviewing court. See Banberry 
and Lafferty, supra, and Homebuilder's Association of Greater 
Salt Lake v. Provo City, 28 Utah 2d 402, 503 P. 2d 451 (1972). 
Allowing such Findings and Conclusions to stand without any 
basis in the record is tantamount to determining that the 
legislative mandate was meaningless and & meaningless mandate 
would not have been enforced by this Court as it did in Utah 
Restaurant Association v. Davis County Board of Health, supra. 
Having determined that those Findings an<fi Conclusions were 
mandated, that mandate must be interpreted in such a manner "as 
to render all parts thereof relevant and meaningful. . ." Millett 
v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P. 2d 934 (Utah 1980). 
That is not to say that all rule-making actions by 
administrative bodies must be based upon evidence produced upon 
the record of the hearing where such rules are adopted. The 
mandate, as this Court noted in Utah Restaurant Association v. 
Davis County, supra, is somewhat unusual in regard to non-
ad judicatory proceedings. Nevertheless, the legislature did see 
fit to mandate that this procedure normally utilized in such 
adjudicatory proceedings, be utilized in regard to particular 
17 
rulemaking hearings of the local board of health. Thus, Basic 
hornbook law prohibits it from basing its decision upon its own 
knowledge, secret staff input, or other evidence outside of the 
hearing. 2 Am. Jr. 2d, Administrative Law, Section 444, 73A 
C.J.S., Public Administrative Law and Procedure, Sec. 126, and 18 
A.L.R. 2d, Administrative Law - Evidence, Sec. 3. Utah case law, 
in matters where such Findings and Conclusions have been 
required, have similarly mandated that they must be based upon 
evidence brought into the case and made part of the record. See 
Los Angeles & S. L. R. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 17 P. 2d 
287 (Utah 1932) (Denial of application to discontinue operation 
of agency railroad station); Spencer v. Industrial Commission, 81 
Utah 511, 20 P. 2d 618 (1933) (Industrial Commission award); 
Clearfield State Bank v. Brimhall, 24 Utah 2d 339, 471 P. 2d 161 
(1970) (Order of Financial Institutions Commissioner for a unit 
bank in Clearfield, Utah); State of Utah in the Interest of 
Pilling v. Lance, 23 Utah 2d 407, 464 P. 2d 395 (1970) (Social 
file not introduced at hearing). 
In City of Fairbanks v. Alaska P.U.C., 611 P. 2d 493 (Alaska 
1980), the Alaska Supreme Court concisely expressed the purposes 
of the requirement that the facts found by an agency be based 
only upon evidence in the record: 
First, it helps to ensure that the agency does not make 
decisions that have no adequate basis in fact; second, 
it gives opposing parties the opportunity to challenge 
the agency's reasoning process and the correctness of 
the decision; and third, it affords reviewing courts 
the opportunity to evaluate the decision. 
As earlier reflected, in the present case, the Board's fee 
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standards were prepared from the personal knowledge and input of 
its members and staff. Although persons attending the hearing 
were allowed to voice their opinions concerning the imposition of 
the fee standards, they were not provided with any substantive 
evidence concerning those standards, their bases, nor the bases 
of the board's actions. Similarly, they were denied an effective 
opportunity for rebuttal, verification or explanation regarding 
the bases of those actions, with no opportunity to address the 
competency, sufficiency, or accuracy of the input considered by 
the Board. The hearing was apparently intended to satisfy what 
the Board considered to be a mere technicality of the Code, not 
to secure any valid input nor to allow tjie public to ensure that 
evidence was competent, sufficient and accurate. Perhaps most 
important, however, since the Board's Findings and Conclusions 
are not supported by evidence within the record, a reviewing 
court was left with no means to adequately evaluate these 
determinations of the Board. 
The reasonableness of the fees being imposed by the Board 
were challenged by the public at the hearing and in written 
comments received by the Board prior to the hearing. However, 
the Board did not disclose any basis of its calculations nor was 
anyone from the Board even present at the hearing. Notwith-
standing the lack of information at the hearing, one of the 
Board's Findings of Fact was that "(W)hile objection was raised 
by several individuals as to the charging of the fees, no 
information was brought forward which demonstrated that the 
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proposed fees . . . was not tied directly to the cost of the 
inspection program and to be used to support this cost." This 
Finding reflects that the Board improperly viewed its burden of 
determining the reasonableness of the fee schedule prior to its 
adoption. The Board failed to meet its specific burden of 
showing the bases upon which the reasonableness of the proposed 
fees could be determined, as required by Banberry, Laffertyf and 
Homebuilders, Supra. 
Under such circumstances, it is respectfully submitted that 
the District Court properly determined that the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law by the board in support of its adoption of 
its food service/food establishment licensing fee standards must 
be supported by some evidence presented at the public hearing 
and, absent such support, the standard was invalid and void, ab 
initio. Again, it is respectfully submitted that the decision by 
the Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the District Court 
involves an important question of municipal and state law which 
has not been, but should be, settled by this Court for the 
reasons set forth at the beginning of this Argument. 
ATKIN & ANDERSON 
^ i«"""^il if i i fa i . . ii 1.1 ii • -
Gary E. "Atkin 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
3li South State Street 
Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-2552 
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ADDENDUM TO RESPONDENTS* BRIEF 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS 
10-8-80. License fees and taxes. 
They may raise revenue by levying and collecting a license 
fee or tax on any business within the limits of the city, and 
regulate the same by ordinance; provided, that no Utah city or 
town shall collect a license fee or tax hereunder from any 
solicitor or salesman who solicits, obtains orders for or sells 
goods in such city or town solely for resale; and no enumeration 
of powers of cities contained in this chapter, shall be deemed to 
limit or restrict the general grant of authority hereby 
conferred. All such license fees and taxes shall be uniform in 
respect to the class upon which they are imposed. 
26-1-6. Fee schedule adopted by department. 
The department may adopt a schedule of fees that may be 
assessed for services rendered by the department, provided that 
such fees shall be reasonable and fair and shall be submitted to 
and approved by the legislature as part of the department's 
annual appropriations request. Such fees shall be paid into the 
state treasury in accordance with Section 63-38-9. 
26-24-14. Powers and duties of departments. 
• * * 
(14) establish and collect appropriate fees, to accept, use 
and administer all federal, state, or private donations or grants 
of funds, property, services, or materials for public health 
purposes, and to make such agreements, not inconsistent with law, 
as may be required as a condition to receiving such donation or 
grant; 
* * * 
26-24-18. Health department fund - Sources - Uses. 
The treasurer of a health department shall, on organization 
of the department, create a health department fund to which shall 
be credited any moneys appropriated or otherwise made available 
by participating counties, cities, or other local political 
subdivisions and any moneys received from the state, federal 
government, or from surpluses, grants, fees or donations for 
local health purposes. Any moneys credited to this fund shall oe 
expended only for maintenance and operation of the local health 
department and claims or demands against the fund shall be 
allowed on certification by the health officer or other employee 
of the local health department designated by the board. 
26-24-20. Regulations adopted by local board - Procedure -
Administrative and Judicial Review of Actions. 
(1) The board may adopt rules, regulations, and standards, 
not in conflict with rules of the department . . . 
(2) The board shall provide public hearings prior to the 
adoption of any rule, regulation or standard. Notice of any such 
public hearing shall be published at least twice in a newspaper 
of general circulation in the area within the jurisdiction of the 
local health department. 
(3) The hearings may be conducted by the board at a regular 
or special meeting, or the board may appoint hearing officers, 
who shall have power and authority to conduct hearings in the 
name of the board at a designated time and place. A record or 
summary of the proceedings of any hearing shall be taken and 
filed with the board, together with findings of fact, conclusions 
of law, and the order of the board or hearing officer. In any 
hearing, a member of the board or the hearing officer shall have 
the power to administer oaths, examine witnesses, and issue 
notice of the hearings or subpoenas in the name of the board 
requiring the testimony of witnesses and the production of 
evidence relevant to any matter in the hearing. 
* * * 
G a r y E. A t h m , SBN 144 
A t t o r n e y r o r P l a m t i t r s 
i d 5 S o u t h S t a t e S t r e e t , #400 
S a l t Lane C i t y , U t a h 8 4 1 1 1 
( d u l ) 511-2^51 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH RESTAURANT ASSOCIATION, a 
U t a h n o n - p r o r i t c o r p o r a t i o n , 
UTAH RETAIL GROCERS ASSOCIATION, 
a U t a h n o n - p r o r i t c o r p o r a t i o n , 
UTAn HOTEL-MOTEL ASSOCIATION, a 
U t a n n o n - p r o t i t c o r p o r a t i o n , 
LAMB'S RESTAURANT, FLYING " J " 
UTAH FOOD & CATERING, I N C . , DELS 
FAMILY RESTAURANTS, KENTUCKY 
F R I E D CHICKEN-HARMON'S MANAGE-
MENT C O R P . , GASTRONOMY, I N C . , 
TACO MAKER, I N C . , MARKET STREET 
G R I L L , MARKET STREET BROILER 
NEW YORKER RESTAURANT, HILTON 
HOTELS-PEARSON E N T E R P R I S E S , 
S I Z Z L I N G PLATTER, I N C . , S T A N ' S 
MARKET, N. P . S . , CRYSTAL 
PALACE MARKET, WHEEL-IN MARKET, 
THE TABLE SUPPLY, VOYLES 
MARKET, THE STORE, ALBERTSON'S 
I N C . , FAMILY MARKET, SAFEWAY 
STORES, I N C . , THE TANNING 
EXPERIENCE, O. P . SKAGGS # i , 
SAB E N T E R P R I S E S , 8TH AVE. 
MEAT AND GROCERY, MACEY'S, 
I N C . , B E L u ' S 48TH S T . MARKET, 
PETERSON FOODTOWN, F O O D - 4 - L E S S 
D A N ' S FOODS, M O N T I E ' S BESTWAY, 
AND H A L E ' S MARKET, 
P l a i n t i n s , 
- v s -
SALT LAKE CITY-COUNTY BOARD OF 
HEALTH, 
STIPULATION OF FACTS AND 
ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION 
CJ.VI1 No. Cdb-9J2^t 
Honorable Judge Moiiat 
Defendant. 
COME NOW the parties to the aoove-ent1tled natter, by 
and through their counsel or record and do hereby stipulate and 
agree as rollows: 
1. Plaintiff Associations, the Utah Restaurant 
Association, Utah Retail Grocer's Association, and Utah 
Hotel-Motel Association, are non~pront corporations, duly 
oryanized and existing under the laws or the State or Utah, 
with their principal places or business in Salt Lake County, 
and whose memberships are composed or persons, corporations, 
partnerships, and other entities engaged in, associated with, 
or having a direct interest in, the restaurant and food service 
industry in this state, whose memoerships include numerous 
persons whose businesses are operated within Salt Lake County, 
and which are subject to the "Food Service/Food Establishment 
Licensing Fee" standard involved in this action. Each of those 
associations is a person within the meaning of Utah's 
Declaratory Judgment Act, Sections 78-33-1, et seq., Utah Code 
Anno, (1953), as amended and Utah's Administrative Rulemaking 
Act, Section o3-46a-l, et seq., Utah Code Anno. (1953), as 
amended, anu each piamtii: is entitled to the reiiei sought 
tiiereunoer. 
z. The remaining plamtirrs are also persons suuject 
to, and whose legal relations are arrected by, tne "Food 
Service/Food Establishment Licensing Fee" stanuaard and Fee 
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Schedule involved herein ana are persons witmn the meaning OL 
the Declaratory Judgment Act, Sections 7d-33-l, et seq. U tan 
Coue Anno. (19^3), as amenued, as well as within the Uian 
Administrative Rulemaking Act, Section 63-4ba-l, et seq., Utan 
Code Anno. (19b3), as amended. 
3. The Salt Lake City-County Board or Healtn 
(here±naiter referred to as the "Board") is a non-electea boay, 
appointed by the Salt Lake City and County Commissioners to act 
ab a local board or health pursuant to the provisions oi 
Sections 2b-24-l, et seq., Utah Code Anno. (19D3), as amended, 
whose statutory powers and duties are speciried therein. 
4. The Board, as a separate body, is amenaole to suit 
and lfc subject to the jurisdiction and process or tins Court, 
pursuant to Sections b3-46a-13, Utah Code Anno. (19sJ), as 
amended, and Section 78-33-1, et seq., Utah Code Anno. (19D3J, 
as amended. 
b. This is an action brought by the piaintuts pursuant 
to the provisions or the atoresaid Section^ and Rule bl, Utah 
Rules ot Civil Procedure, ror a declaratory judgment to 
determine the validity and constitutionality ot the "Food 
Service/Foou Establishment Licensing Fee" standard adopted oy 
the Boaro and which is the suoject or this action. 
6. Exhibits "A" through "H", which are attached hereto 
and, uy reference, made a part hereoi, accurately rellect ail 
meetings or the Board relative to the standara and ree schedule 
specirieu therein, which is the suoject master 01 tins action 
and accurately set iorth the times, places^ and purposes or 
those meetings, as well as all actions taken, comments made, 
and other input on that topic at those meetings, and all 
notices thereoi, which were considered in the ultimate 
lormulation or the Board's Findings 01 Fact and Conclusions or 
Law relative to the adoption 01 the standard and tee schedule, 
as included within those Exhibits. 
7. Except as referred to in Paragraphs 6 there are no 
other items ot testimony, documents, papers, Findings or Fact, 
Conclusions or Law, or Orders or the Board regarding the 
proposal tor the adoption or the standard ana ree schedule 
which is the subject or this action. 
d. The inspections contemplated in the aroresaid 
standard and tee schedule would constitute no change trom such 
inspections previously conducted, except that those previous 
inspections were paid with Heath Department runds. 
9. Fees collected to date pursuant to the "Food 
Service/Food Establishment Licensing Fee" standard and ree 
soheuv-le have not Deen expended for any purpose out have been 
deposited into a health department rund and are reilecteJ, ror 
bookkeeping purposes, as a credit to a separate discretionary 
Heaith Department account, which does not rerlect deposits iron 
any other source. It is intended that this account would oe 
used to pay ror a portion ot the lood inspection program or, n 
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the Court should so direct, to provide a reiuna to tne persons 
paying tne same. 
10. The dollar amounts, categories and dennitions 
applied to those categories as rerlected in the "Food 
Service/Foou Establishment Licensing Fee" standard ana ree 
schedule were prepared by, ana adopted cased upon the 
recommendations or, the Health Department staii. The stari 
indicated, and the Board determined based upon the 
recommendations of stair and their own deliberations, that 
those dollar amounts, categories and detimtions were 
reasonauie. There was no public input regarding those dollar 
amounts, categories, ana detinitions. 
11. This action is one which requires the immediate 
attention 01 this Court and an immediate hearing in the 
interests or all parties concerned, in that lrreparaole harm 
may result to either or ooth parties absent such immediate 
determination or the Court, unless the Court's time is rurther 
encuinuered with a hearing on a temporary restraining order or 
injunction. It appearing that there are no remaining issuer or 
materxal tact to preclude a determination on the issues 01 law 
oy tiiis Court, it is respectfully submitted that there is no 
need to delay tne ultimate hearing herein, witn the resulting 
necessity or a hearing on a temporary restraining order or 
mjunct ion. 
- t > -
BASED UPON the roregomg stipulations or tact, the 
parties seek the Decision ot tins Court as to the following 
issues of law: 
1. Does the Detendant have the authority to impose 
charges such as those speciried in the standard imposing the 
"Food Service/Food Establishment Licensing Fee" ana fee 
schedule tor rood service establishments, pursuant to the 
provisions or Section 26-24-1, et seq., Utah Code Anno. (1953), 
or otherwise and, it not, is the standard imposing those 
charges valid? 
2. Did tne Defendant comply with the requirements or 
Section 26-24-1, et seq., Utah Code Anno. (19b3), in imposing 
the "Food Service/Food Establishment Licensing FeeM and fee 
schedule ror rood service establishments and, ir not, is the 
standard imposing those charges valid? 
3. Are the Findings or Fact and Conclusions or Law by 
the Board (Exhibit "E"), supported by any evidence presented at 
the hearings on this matter and, ir not, is the standard 
imposiny those charges valid? 
4. Do the provisions or the "Food Service/Food 
Establ isninent Licensing Fee" ana ree schedule amount to a 
"tax", rather than a "fee"? Ir so, the parties stipulate that 
the standard is not valid. 
Counsel do rurther stipulate and agree that they shall 
rile their mutual Motions ror Summary Judgment and supporting 
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Memoranda, based upon t h e t o r e g o i n g S t i p u l a t i o n w i t h i n two 
weeKs trom t h e d a t e o r e x e c u t i o n or t h i s S t i p u l a t i o n a n a , t h a t 
they s h a l l t i l e any d e s i r e d r e s p o n s i v e Memoranda w i t h i n one 
wee< a r t e r s e r v i c e or t h e i r o p p o n e n t ' s Motion and Meraorandun, 
so a s to a l l o w c o n s i d e r a t i o n by t h e Cour t o t t h i s m a t t e r ana 
soon a r t e r May 29, 1987 , a s w i l l n e e t wi th t h e C o u r t ' s S c n e u ^ l e 
a n a , by way or t h i s S t i p u l a t i o n , move t h e Cour t l o r such an 
a c c e l l e r a t e d h e a r i n g a a t e . / ^ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS r DAY O F / ^ 7 ^ I 9 d 7 . 
:K±n, E s q . 
fy t o r P l a m t i t t b 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
fct* ~f m i;i 
Thomas L. Chrlbtensen, Esq. 
Attorneys tor Derendaat 
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P V T T T r i T m I t * 
S A L T L A K E &$} C I T Y - C O U N T Y 
H E A L T H J5= (^DEPARTMENT 
610 South 2nd East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone: 530-7500 • 
HARRY L. GIBBONS, M.Dn M.P.H. 
Director 
NOTICE OF PUBLIC HEARING 
BOARt, OF HEALTH 
L. .tod Mormon. M.D. 
Chairman 
C O ClarV. D OS. 
Vice Chairman 
Craig E. Petenon 
Crty Government 
M. Tom Shimuu 
County Commissioner 
Rob** A Angle 
John M Sevan, D O S . 
•tome* Dams. Mayor 
South San Lake 
Janet R. Green 
Wilfred Higash.. Ph 0. 
Ctndy Guti-Jensen 
LaRetl 0 Muir. Mayor 
Murray City 
Rulon Simmons. M D 
Lawrence P. Smith, Mayor 
Sandy Cfty 
•tori Taylor 
Sandra K Ercanbrack 
Secretary 
Before the Salt Lake City-County Board of 
Health 
In the matter of proposed annual fees to be charged for 
inspections of FOOD ESTABLISHMENTS
 r POOD SERVICE ESTABLISHMENTS, 
AND ESTABLISHMENTS FOR THE PROCESSING OF MEAT AND MEAT FOOD 
PRODUCTS. 
TO WHOM IT MAY 0CNCERN: 
Please take notice that the Salt Lake City-County Board of Health will 
conduct a public hearing for the purpose of receiving comments and 
reccrmendations concerning proposed annual fees to be charged for 
inspection of F0CD ESTABLISHMENTS, FOOD SERVICE ESTABLISHMENTS, A!© 
ESTABLISHMENTS FOR THE PROCESSING OF MEAT AND MEAT FOOD PRODUCTS. 
Authority to charge the said fees is embodied in Section 4.2 of the 
respective said regulations of the Salt Lake City-County Health 
Department, pursuant to Section 26-24-14 (14), Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as arrended. 
Copies of the full text of the proposed fee charges are now available 
for public inspection at the Salt Lake City-County Health Department 
Building, 610 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
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A hearing for the purpose of obtaining caiments concerning the 
proposed fee charges has been scheduled for Septenber 10, 1986, 
10:00 a.m., at the Salt Lake City-County Health Department 
auditorium, 610 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
Representatives of food establishments, food service establishments, 
establishments for the processing of meat and neat food products, 
hospitals, nursing hemes, correctional institutions day care canters, 
and the general jublic within or outside Salt Lake County are 
invited to appear and present their views relevant to the proposals. 
Oral statements will be accepted at the hearing, but, for accuracy 
of the record, written statements are encouraged and will be 
accepted at the time of the hearing or prior thereto. 
Statements or questions should be addressed to: Eugene Devenport, 
Proposed Fee Charges, Salt Lake City-County Health Department, 
610 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. Telephone 
number (801) 530-7525. Statements will be accepted if received 
on or before September 10, 1986, 5:00 p.m. 
POOD SERVICE/FQDD ESTABLISHMENT 
LICENSING FEE STANDARDS 
This Standard is adopted this day 
of , 19 86, by the Salt Lake City-County 
Board of Health, a local board of health organized pursuant 
to Section 26-24-9, U.C.A. (1953). 
W I T N E S S E T H : 
WHEREAS, it has became necessary to establish a 
fee schedule for food/food service establishments in Salt Lake 
Oounty to pay a portion of Salt Lake City-County Health Depart-
ment's reasonable expenses of inspecting and enforcing 
State and local food rules and regulations : and 
WHEREAS, the Salt Lake City-County Health Departinent 
is authorized to adopt this standard pursuant to Section 
26-24-14 (14) D.C.A. (1953), and Salt Lake City-County Health 
Department Regulation No. 4 and No. 5, and No. 6, Food 
Service Establishments and Food Establishments, Sections 4.2. 
NOW, THEREFORE, The Salt Lake City^-County Board of 
Health ordains as follows : 
Section I, Definitions: 
Food Service Establishments - Restaurants, restaurants/clubs, 
restaurants/fast food, cafeterias, 
snack bars/fountains, nursing 
homes, day care centers, bars, 
lounges, ice cream stores, 
or 
Food Establishments -
intended for individual portion 
service, whether the consumption is 
on or off the premises or there is 
a charge for the food. This does not 
include private hemes where food is 
prepared or served for individual 
family consumption. 
Grocery stores, bakeries, candy 
factories, bottling plants, convenience 
stores, canning factories, meat 
processing plants, cold storage ware-
houses, food storage warehouses, or 
similar establishments where food pro-
ducts are manufactured, canned, packed, 
processed, stored, transported, prepared, 
sold, or offered for sale. 




Food Service establishments that oper-
ate at a fixed location for not more than 
14 consecutive days in conjunction with 
a single event or celebration. 
Include, but are not limited to, cash 
register stands, drive-up windows, walk-
up windows, and/or different points from 
which food is dispensed or served to the 
public. Waited tables are not considered 
service bays. 
Seating that is available for the 
public within a food service establishment. 
The number of seats shall be determined 
by the listing an the business license 
application or by physical count by the 
regulatory authority. 
Banquet seating, not used for everyday 
seating, shall not be included in the 
total number of seats. The number of 
beds, in lieu of xhe number of seats, 
may be used to classify hospitals and 
correctional institutions. 
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Square Footage - Square footage will be determined 
on the basifc of the outside wall 
measurements of the food establishment. 
Section II. Annual Fees. All food service/food establishments 
in Salt Lake County shall be classified according to the following 
criteria into one of six (6) categories for the purpose of 
assessing annual fees: 
Category I $40.00 Day Care centers, nursing hemes and food 
service/food establishments providing 








Food service/food establishments pro-
viding either tv*> service bays or 
eleven to fifty seats. 
Food service/food establishments pro-
viding either three service bays 
or fifty-one to seventy-five seats. 
Food service/food establishments pro-
viding either four or more 
service bays or seventy-six or 
more seats. 




Food establishments with under 
2,000 square feet. 
2,000 to 3,000 square feet. 
3,000 to 5,000 square feet. 
5,000 square feet or more. 
Category VI $10.00 flat 
+ $5.00 per 
day (not to 
exceed $35 total) 
Temporary food service establish-
ments operating fourteen days or 
less. 
Section H I . General Provisions: 
1. All fees shall be paid annually and are due 
in advance on the 1st day of January of each year, 
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after the 1st day of July, except unaer cai^gory vi, -tne i w iui. 
the first year shall be at the rate of 50 per cent (50%) of the 
annual fee. No fees, or any part thereof, may be refunded or 
transferred. 
2. The Salt Lake City-County Health Deparbnent shall 
attempt to notify each food establishment/food service estab-
lishment prior to the date on which fees are due of its deter-
mination of category assignment, and the amount of fees 
due. Fees unpaid after forty-five (45) days of the due date 
will be assessed a penalty of twenty-five per cent (25%) of the 
amount of such fees which shall be added to the original amount. 
Failure to pay annual fees and additional charges after ninety 
(90) days of the due date may result in revocation or suspension 
of food/food service permits and the right to operate. A twenty-
five per cent (25%) charge will be assessed for each returned check. 
3. Consistent with Health Department Regulations No. 4, 
Section 4.2, and No. 5, Section 4.2, and No. 6, Section 4.2, the 
Salt Lake City-County Health Department shall provide notice and 
opportunity for a hearing to consider or reconsider the revocation 
or suspension of the right to operate due to nonpayment of fees. 
4. In determining food establishment/ food service 
establishment categories, the Salt Lake City-County Health Depart-
ment may classify hospitals, correctional facilities, and other 
institutions by seats, beds, or other reasonable criteria. 
Day care centers and nursing hemes will be classified as Category 
I. Food establishments that have multiple units under one roof 
will be classified by square footage. 
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of this standard or the application thereof shall be held to 
be invalid, such invalidity shall not affect the other provisions 
or applications of this standard. The valid peart of any 
clause, sentence, or paragraph of this standard shall be given 
independence from the invalid provisions or application and to 
this end the provisions of this standard is declared to be 
severable. 
Section IV. This Standard shall beccme effective 
fifteen (15) days after its passage. 
APPROVED and ADOPTED on the day ahd year first above 
written. 
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Self 6 Many Legislators 
Flying J Inc. 
Jordan Queen Restaurant 
Flying J Inc. 
Utah Hotel Motel Association 
Self 
Utah Restaurant Association 
Utah Retail Grocer's Association 
Utah Restaurant Association 
Utah Food & Catering 
Stewart Sandwiches 
Dan Glo's Restaurant & Lounge 
Chairman - Salt Lake City Council 
Holiday Inn - Downtown 
Utah Restaurant Association 
Salt Lake City Chamber of Commerce 
Business Enterprise Program 
Business Enterprise Program 
Salt Lake Tribune 
Jimax Lounge 
Jimax Lounge 
Dan Glo's Restaurant 6 Lounge 
Utah Licensed Club Association 
Holiday Inn - Downtown 
Utah Restaurant Association 
Cedar Lounge 
West Valley City Business License 
Utah State Senate 
Self 
Self 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
Afterword^ Restaurant 
Utah Restaurant Association 
Marriott Corporation 
Warren's Restaurant - Roy, Utah 
Utah Taxpayer's Association 
Salt Lake City-Co. Health Department 
Salt Lake City-Co. Health Department 
Salt Lake City-Co. Health Department 
Hearing Officer 
The deadline to receive written comments was set at Wednesday, 
September 10, 1986, at 5t00 p.m. in the Administration Office 
of the Salt Lake City-County Health Department. ,./ 
Julie Peck, Administrative Assistant for the Utah Hotel 
Motel Association, read and submitted written comments. The 
Association is opposed to any collection of fees for health 
inspections. They find it ironic that the County would require 
period inspections of their restaurants- and then charge for the 
inspection. Ms. Peck stated the restaurants contribute to the 
cost through the fees for food handler permits, business, licenses 
and taxes collected. 
Robert Cohne, representing himself as a private taxpayer, 
strongly opposes the proposed food inspection. Mr. Cohne, a 
former restaurant owner, urged the Health Department to seek 
additional funds to cover the inspections from the County Com-
mission from the current tax base. 
Max Fillmore, President of the Utah Restaurant Association 
(URA), read and submitted written comments. The URA strongly 
objects to the fee and recommended that it not be approved. Mr. 
Fillmore stated the Health Department exists for the benefit and 
protection of the general public and that operating expenses 
should be paid from the general tax fund. The department should 
also consider creative methods of filling the inspection need 
other than increasing staff and assessing special fees. Mr. 
Fillmore suggested that the Health Department should deal 
directly in problem areas and conduct lesp frequent inspections 
of restaurants with higher scores. 
Burr Miller, representing Holiday Inn - Downtown, stated 
the proposed fees would create a great butden to an already red-
lined restaurant. 
Don Beck, Utah Licensed Club Association, represents the 
111 licensed private clubs in Utah, 54 of which are in Salt Lake 
County. The Association strongly supports the earlier comments 
made by the Utah Restaurant Association and the Salt Lake Area 
Chamber of Commerce in opposing the proposed food inspection 
fees. Mr. Beck stated the fees are an unfair tax against the 
food industry and urged the Health Department not to adopt the 
standards . 
Earl Hardvick, representing the Salt Lake City Council 
District *4, opposes the proposed standards and classified it 
as a user fee. Adoption of the fees would result in nothing but 
a negative economical impact on facilities required to have the 
inspections. The services are to ensure the safety of the 
general public and should be a general funded item. 
Hersh Ipaktchian, URA Legislative Chairman, read and sub-
mitted written comments. Mr. Ipaktchian strongly opposes the 
proposed fee and feels it is another example of government 
singling out a particular industry to solve an in-house budget 
problem. This issue has statewide impact since other Utah 
r,oo'* ; 
STATEMENT OF POSITION 
SALT LAKE AREA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 
BOARD OF GOVERNORS 
SEPTEMBER 9f 1986 
The Salt Lake Area Chamber of Commerce Board of Governors, in their 
bimonthly meeting held on September 9, 1986, came out unanimously 
against the proposed special fee to finance health inspections. 
It was the consensus of the Board that the present inspections 
are essential to the public health and are a direct benefit to 
the tax payers and residents of this .county. It is a needed service 
to have the inspections, but is discriminatory to expect that the 
inspected facilities should be mandated to pay a fee for such 
service. 
It is our understanding that the duration 
of the inspections are the direct respons 
ience of the City/County Health Departmen 
uling and frequency presents a burden on 
which they should not have to bear. The 
a great deal of property tax to the taxin 
fees for food handlers1 permits. These t 
tional charges such as business licenses 
consitute a true threat to profitability 
,.frequency and content 
ibility, and at the conven-
t. This arbitrary sched-
the food service industry 
industry currently pays 
g entities and also pays 
axes, coupled with addi-
and other such charges, 
and success. 
Several members of the Board of Governors expressed concern regard-
ing the potential of escalating fees, such as this, aimed at 
specific businesses already sorely pressed to make a profit. These 
businesses are already paying health taxes and user fees to govern-
ment entities. 
The Board of Governors of the Salt Lake Area Chamber of Commerce 
regards this proposed fee as a tax increase, and we feel that tax 
increases should be dispersed so that they are not "sock it to 
business" taxes. Since all citizens benefit from the inspections, 
the Salt Lake Area Chamber of Commerce believes that all citizens 
should assist in bearing the cost of such inspections. 
Sincerely submitted, 
Fred S. Ball 
President and General Manager 
Salt Lake Area Chamber of Commerce 
The health inspectors have no more right to inspection fees than the 
firemen do for their inspections. Then what about the meat 
inspectors, weights and measures, etc* are they all going to follow 
suit? The real issue here is who actually benefits from these 
inspections? The general public is who the health department and 
the other inspectors are protecting. It isn't a matter of whether the 
grocer wants or invites the inspectors into our businesses. We have no 
control over if or when we will be inspected. Therefore, if the 
inspection fee is adopted, it would be conceivable to think they may 
want to increase the inspection frequency or length, after all the 
businesses would be paying for the inspections. What better way to 
justify a fee increase. Let's make sure the people who are getting th 
benefit are paying for the service. If the public wants or needs 
inspections then they will have to be willing to pay the price with the 
taxes. This is upfront and above board, not another -hidden tax which 
the business, if it wants to do business in Salt Lake County, has to pa 
Then the businesses are forced to pass on these costs of doing business 
to their customers, through higher prices. The business takes the 
blame for the increase, and the people who are really paying for these 
government services have no understanding or knowledge of what they are 
really paying for. If the health department needs additional revenue 
then they need to go through the proper budgfetting process with the citj 
and county and justify their need to the elected officials and public. 
GOO'-C^ 
UTAH HOTEL MOTEL 
9 / 1 0 / 8 6 ASSOCIATION 
•9 £ichinpt H»C9—-Sutf I 713 
Wl U»« City. UHA W » t 
I HAVE A STATEMENT TO READ ON BEHALF OF MEMBERS OF THE UTAH 
HOTEL MOTEL ASSOCIATION; I AM JULIE PECK, THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
ASSISTANT THERE. 
WE ARE OPPOSED TO ANY COLLECTION OF FEES FOR HEALTH INSPECTIONS. 
WE FIND IT IRONIC THAT THE COUNTY WOULD REQUIRE PERIOD INSPECTION* 
OF OUR RESTAURANTS, AND THEN TURN AROUND AND CHARGE US FOR THAT 
INSPECTION...PARTICULARLY SINCE WE CONTRIBUTE TO THE COST THROUGH 
THE FEES FOR FOOD HANDLERS PERMITS, BUSINESS LICENTES, AND TAXES 
COLLECTED. 
AS AN INDUSTRY WE ARE BEING SINGLED OUT -
ARE ALL OTHER BUSINESSES WHICH REQUIRE INSPECTIONS GOING TO 
BE ASKED TO PAY FOR THOSE. OR JUST THE FOOD SERVICE INDUSTRY? 
IN ANY CASE, WE CONCUR WITH THE UTAH RESTAURANT ASSOCIATION 
THAT THIS IS UNFAIR AND DISCRIMINATORY. AND WE WILL DO UHAT 
IS NECESSARY TO SEE THAT THIS DOES NOT TAKE PLACE. 
M^ APriUATEO WITH 
E^CAN HOTEL & r W f t l 
EL ASSOCIATION M L i 
The proposed annual fees for Inspection of foodservlie and food-related establishments 
©re just another example of government singling out a particular industry to solve an in-hous 
budget problem. The issue goes far beyond the size of the fee Itself and far beyond the 
proposal in Salt Lake County. . /This issue has statewide Impact since other Utah counties 
will follow suit by levying their own fees. We oppose the fee for a major reason. 
The URA has traditionally supported the concept of [health Inspections as an essential 
service to the public. These Inspections do nothing to help restauranteurs in the operation o 
their business; rather, the whole purpose of these Inspections which are required by Utah law 
is to help protect the public from food-borne Illness. If such a service is so essential that i 
is required by law for a general public purpose, then that service should be financed through 
general funds, not a specific fee penalizing the restaurantfeur. If I Install a security device 
in my restaurant, I do so for my own protection. It will be silly for me to charge other 
restaurants or businesses for the cost of my own security system, since it benefits me and I 
should pay for i t . It would be equally silly for me to expect a tax credit since the system 
would lessen demands on the local police force. The same reasoning applies to the proposed 
fees: If public services are for the benefit of the public and, In fact , required by law, then 
financing should come from public funds. 
In addition, health departments already receive special monies to offset the costs of 
inspections. Our employees are required by law to pay for food handler's permits. How ma 
other businesses are regulated to the extent that their employees must pay the government 
in order to acquire work? We are already one of the most regulated businesses in the count 
and we pay a variety of special taxes, assessments and fees on equipment and menu items. 
The fees pile up, and yet, according to a recent Mational Restaurant Association survey, the 
profit of an average restaurant is less than 3%. Additional fees and taxes will only reduce 
this percentage while having no positive impact on business. 
If this proposal is adopted, what will we see next? Will counties and mur icipalities soc 
charge us special fees for fire protection? Will we see special fees for police protection? 
Since some restaurants receive a high traffic volume, will these firms be assessed a special f 
for highway and road improvement? Everytime there is a budget crunch, will a government i 
rush in to assess a special fee or tax? And how high will the fee go? As businessmen we 
know that a fee of $60 today will soon be increased to $100, then $150, whatever amount is 
needed to solve the government's problem. 
Restaurants are shown to have one of the highest rates of business failure, and the last 
thing government should do Is start Increasing taxes by disguising them as a special fee. If 
there is a budgetary problem within the health department, then that department should eithc 
obtain more funding from the general public or tighten It* own financial belt. If an individuc 
needs more money, he or she works harder or becomes mj)re productive. We believe that 




MR. FILLMORE WENT ON TO EXPLAIN THAT HE FEELS THE rR0 r03ED 
INSPECTION FEE SCHEDULE IS A VERY IMPORTANT ISSUE. HE DID NOT 
FEEL DETAILED SPECIFICS WERE MADE AVAILABLE WITH RESPECT TO THE 
FEE SCHEDULE, AND SERIOUSLY QUESTIONED THE NEED FOR Tnr FEES, 
BUT IF THEY ARE NECESSARY, THE SOURCE FOR THOSE FUNDS SHOULD PC 
THE GENERAL TAX FUND AND NOT FROM FEES OR FROM THE TAUAYERS. 
MR. FILLMORE STATED BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS, LEGISLATE;. 
TAXPAYERS, THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, AND THE AREA COUNCIL DC NOT 
FEEL FEES ARE NECESSARY. MR. FILLMORE REPRESENTED THAT SENATOR 
HAVEN BARLOW STATED THAT IT WAS NOT THE INTENT OF THE 
LEGISLATURE IN 26-24-H, UCA, TO ESTABLISH A PROCEDURE FOR FEE 
COLLECTION, AND THE LEGISLATURE SHOULD REVIEW THAT SECTION FOR 
CLARIFICATION. MR. FILLMORE MENTIONED THAT NONE OF THE BOARD 
MEMBERS WERE PRESENT FOR THE PUBLIC HEARING HELD SEFTEMPER 10, 
1986, AND HE QUESTIONED HOW THEY COULD, IN GOOD CONSCIENCE, VOTE 
ON A PROPOSAL THAT HAD NOT BEEN CLEARLY DISCUSSED. 
GARY ATKIN, ATTORNEY FOR UTAH RESTAURANT ASSOCIATIOH, STATED 
THAT HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE APPROACH TAKEN ON IMPOSITION OF 
FEES. HE DID NOT FEEL BOARD MEMBERS WERE AWARE OF THE FEELINGS 
OF RESTAURANT OWNERS AND THE OPPOSITION TO THE FEES AT THIS 
STAGE. 
norzT nnn-. 
MAX FILLMORE, PRESIDENT OF UTAH RESTAURANT ASSOCIATION. FEAD A 
STATEMENT IN BEHALF OF THE ASSOCIATION. THAT STATEMENT IS 
ATTACHED HERETO AS EXHIBIT A, AND BY REFERENCE MADE A FART 
HEREOF. 
GENERAL DISSATISFACTION WAS EXPRESSED ABOUT THE PUBLIC 
HEARING. MR. ATKIN STATEO THAT THERE WAS HO BACKGROUND 
INFORMATION DISCUSSED, AND NO ONE REALLY ANSWERED THE QUESTION 
WHY FEES NEEDED TO BE IMPOSED. THIS INSPECTION SHOULD PE PAID 
FDR BY TAXES OR TAKEN OUT OF THE BUDGET. NOTHING WAS STATED AS 
TO WHY THE AMOUNT OF FEES WERE NECESSARY, NOR HDW THE FEES WERE 
DETERMINED. MR. ATKIN CITED A COMPARISON BETWEEN FEES FOR DAY 
CARE AND NURSING HOMES, AND RESTAURANTS. THE QUESTION was AS>ED 
HOW THE COST TO THE RESTAURANT WAS DETERMINED. FOR EXAMPLE, 
WHAT IS THE DIFERENCE BETWEEN A RESTAURANT WITH ONE CASH 
REGISTER AND 10 TABLES AND A RESTAURANT WITH TWO CASH REGISTERS 
AND 10 TABLES. HOW IS THAT FEE DETERMINED? MR. ATUN STATED 
THAT NONE OF THESE FACTORS HAD BEEN PRESENTED AT THIS 5TAGE. 
THE HEARING OFFICER SHOULD HAVE PRESENTED FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW FOLLOWING THE HEARING. NOME OF THE NEGATIVE 
FACTORS HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED. THE IDEA OF A PUBLIC HEAFING IS 
TO CONSIDER ALL THESE THINGS AND LET PEOPLE ASK QUESTIONS, BUT 
THE ONLY THING THEY WERE TOLD WAS THAT FEES WOULD TE IMF03ED. 
THE QUESTION, "WHAT DO YOU HAVE TO SAY ABOUT IT''" SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN ASKED. 
MR. ATKIN STATED THAT THE FEE WAS INAPPROPRIATE AND THE ACTION 
TAKEN WAS QUESTIONABLE. HE STATED THEY HAD BEEN THROUGH THIS 
WITH DAVIS COUNTY, AND RE50RTED TO THE COURT TO SETTLE THE 
ISSUE, AND HE REALIZES THAT SALT LAKE COUNTY HAS AN ACVI30P JUST 
AS DAVIS COUNTY DID, AND WE WANT TO BE SURE AND -HE WANT TO BEND 
OVER BACKWARDS AND MAKE SURE THAT WE| HAVE CROSSED OUR Ts AND 
DOTTED OUR Is". WE NEED TO BE SURE WHERE THE FEES ARE GOING TO 
GO AND WHAT TO EXPECT SO THERE IS NO APPEAL TO THE 5UFREME COURT. 
BILL DAVIS STATED THAT HE RECOGNIZED THE CONCERN OF THE 
RESTAURANT OWNERS, BUT THE DEPARTMENT HAD GONE THROUGH THE 
PROCESS OF DETERMINING THE NEED AS WE HAVE EXPERIENCED COSTS IN 
THE PROGRAM AND STILL FELT THE HEED TO SUPPLEMENT THROUGH FEES. 
THIS IS A MANDATORY PROGRAM THAT IS DONE SIMILAR TO THE 
ASBESTOS PROGRAM. ADOPTION OF FEES AS A PART OF REGULATIONS 
DATES BACK TO 19B1 WHEN FEES WERE INSTITUTED FOR SOLID WASTE. 
SINCE THAT TIME FEES HAVE ALSO BEEN INSTITUTED FOR OTHER 
INSPECTIONS. MR. DAVIS STATED THE CONCEPT IS THAT FUNDING 
SHOULD COME FROM GENERAL TAXES, BUT IF THAT WILL NOT SUFFORT 
PROGRAMS, THE USER FEE IS A REASONABLE WAY TO HELF SUPPORT THE 
COST OF THE PROGRAM. WE BELIEVE THOSE COSTS WILL BE COPIED 
THROUGH TO THE CONSUMER FOR USE OF SERVICE. 
AS TO THE AMOUNT OF THE FEE, STAFF FELT THE FEE WAS VERY 
REASONABLE AND DETERMINED NOT TO GO FOR THE FULL AMOUNT OF THE 
COST OF THE PROGRAM BEING SUPPORTED BY THE FEE. A PCRTIOH OF 
THE FEE WAS BUDGETARILY ACCEPTABLE TO THE STAFF, AND THE 
RESTAURANT CAN PASS THE FEE ON TO THE CONSUMER. 
STAFF DID MAKE AN EFFORT TO GAIN INPUT. THIRTY DAYS WERE 
ALLOWED FOR COMMENTS PRIOR TO THE PUBLIC HEARING. 
THE PROPOSED FEE WAS DISCUSSED WITH THE BOARD, AND AN EFFORT 
HAS HADE TO GAIN INPUT AS FART OF THE PUBLIC HEARING FRQwESS. 
STAFF FELT THEY HAD FOLLOWED THE SUPREME COURT GUIDELINES WHICH 
OUTLINED PROCEDURES THAT SHOULD BE FOLLOWED. A SPECIFIC ACCOUNT 
HAS INCLUDED IN THE BUDGET AND THE FEE HILL BE ALLOCATED TO THAT 
I 
ACCOUNT. RECORDS HILL BE KEPT TO S;HOW HHERE FEE COLLECTIONS GO 
AND WHAT THE FUNDS ARE SPENT FOR. 
DR. BEVAN ASKED IF STAFF KNEW HOW MUCH HONEY THIS FEE WOULD 
RAISE, HOH MUCH THE SERVICE COSTS, AND WHAT PORTION OF THE COST 
WOULD BE RAISED THROUGH FEE COLLECTION. DR. GIBBOUS RESPONDED 
THAT FEES HOULD PRODUCE SLIGHTLY LESS THAN HALF THE COST OF THE 
PROGRAM. ALL OTHER PROGRAMS ARE APJPROXIMATELY 507. FUNDED BY 
FEES. A FEE IS CHARGED FOR IMMUNIZATIONS, AND THE INSPECTION 
AND MAINTENANCE PROGRAM IS TOTALLY SUPPORTED BY FEES. 
TAMARA HHARTON STATED THAT THE FEE IS NECESSARY BECAUSE OF 
RISING COSTS AND LOSS OF FEDERAL MONEY. SHE FELT IT WAS 
UNFORTUNATE THAT A TASK FORCE WAS NOT SET UP TO STUDY THIS , BUT 
REVIEW OF THE MATERIAL REVEALED THAT CALIFORNIA, NEVADA AND 
NEBRASKA HAVE CHARGED FEES FOR YEARS. PEOPLE ARE PEALLV FED UP 
WITH BEING TAXED AND TAXED, AMD SHE FEELS THERE SHOULD BE A 
FEE. THERE WERE SOME CONCERNS EXPRESSED THAT THE FEE WOULD 
SKYROCKET, BUT DR. GIBBONS STATED THAT STAFF WORKS CLOSELY WITH 
j 
THE BOARD, AND COULD NOT INCREASE THE FEE WITHOUT BOARD 
APPROVAL. 
RON MORGAN, UTAH RESTAURANT ASSOCIATION, STATED THE BASIC 
OBJECTION OF THE ASSOCIATION WAS THEY ARE TOLD THE HEALTH 
DEPARTMENT IS COMING TO INSPECT OUR RESTAURANTS AND THEY 
THEREFORE FEEL THE COST SHOULD BE PAID FROM THE GENERAL FUND. 
IF WE LOOK BACK HISTORICALLY, WE FIND FEES START OUT VEFY SMALL 
AND THEN BEGIN TO EXPAND. THE RESTAURANT ASSOCIATION IS NOT 
ONLY LOOKING AT TODAY, BUT FIVE TO TEN YEARS FROM TODAY. IF 
HEALTH IS INSPECTING AT OUR REQUEST, THEY SHOULD CHARGE US. 
TWO MEMBERS OF THE STATE SENATE WERE PRESENT AT THE HEARING AND 
BOTH SAID THAT IT WAS NOT THE IUTENT OF THE LEGISLATURE TO 
PROVIDE FOR FEES. THE INTENT WAS TO CHARGE THOSE FEO^LE WHO 
COME AND PROVIDE A SERVICE FOR MYSELF OR MY FAMILY. AT THAT 
POINT IT IS APPROPRIATE TO CHARGE A FEE. MR. MORGAN FELT THE 
HEALTH DEPARTMENT STAFF CONVEYED THE IDEA, "WE REALLY DON'T CARE 
WHAT YOU GUYS SAY". THE RESTAURANT ASSOCIATION WENT TO THE 
SUPREME COURT ABOUT THESE ISSUES, AND IF THE BOARD OF HEALTH 
IMPOSES THIS FEE,THE ASSOCIATION WILL GO BACK TO THE SUPREME 
COURT ON THE FIRST, SECOND AND THIRD ISSUES. THE LEGISLATURE, 
IN JANUARY, WILL SAY IT WAS NOT OUR INTENT FOR THIS TO HAPPEN. 
DOUGLAS SMITH COMMENTED THAT MR. MORGAN'S SUPPOSITION MCO'JT WHAT 
THE SUPREME COURT AND LEGISLATURE WOULD DO WAS GUESTIMATE AT 
BEST, AND HE DID NOT FEEL THAT SUPPOSITION APFLIED TO THE 
ADOPTION OF THIS FEE. A QUESTION WAS RAISED ABOUT THE 
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE RESTAURANT ORGANIZATIONS AND A BANK. A 
BANK IS EXAMINED REGULARLY AND IS REGULATED FOR THE PROTECTION 
OF THE DEPOSITOR. MR. MORGAN COUNTERED THAT BANCS ARE EXAMINED 
IN ORDER TO QUALIFY FOR FEDERAL INSURANCE. BANKS ARE EXAMINED 
AND PAY A FEE TO PROTECT THE DEFOStTORS TO MAKE SURE THE 
DEPOSITS ARE SECURED. RESTAURANTS SHOULD BE INSPECTED TO MAKE 
CERTAIN THAT ACTIONS BEING TAKEN ARE IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE 
PUBLIC. MR. MORGAN CITED A RECENT CONTACT KITH THE STATE 
REGARDIN6 SUMMIT SAVINGS. BANKS ARE EXAMINED SO THEY CAM 
OUALIFY FOR FEDERAL INSURANCE. THIS IS FOR THE PROTECTION OF 
THE DEPOSITORS. 
MR. MORGAN STATED THAT THEY WANTED TO CLARIFY TWO OR THREE 
POINTS THAT DID NOT GET THROUGH AT THE PUBLIC HEARING. 
DICK BOLLARD STATED THAT THE DEPARTMENT IS MANDATED TO PERFORM 
INSPECTIONS AND RECEIVES FEES FROM OTHER PROGRAMS, AND IT DOES 
NOT SEEM THAT HEALTH IS SINGLING OUT THE RESTAURANT 
ASSOCIATION. MR. BOLLARD WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE SUPREME COURT 
RULING AGAINST DAVIS COUNTY WAS ON A TECHNICALITY RESULTING FROM 
A PROCEDURAL ERROR. THE INTENT TO COLLECT FEES WAS NOT REALLY 
OBJECTED TO IN THAT ACTION. 
PAUL MC CLURE STATED THAT HE COULD FEEL FOR THE RESTAURANT 
ASSOCIATION BECAUSE HE OPERATES A BUSINESS AND COSTS A^ .E VERY 
CRITICAL TO BUSINESSMEN. AN ORGANIZATION TO WHICH HE BELONGS 
RECENTLY VOTED ON THE ISSUE OF FEES ON A NATIONAL LEVEL. MR. 
MC CLURE DIRECTED THAT THE RECORD SHOW THAT HE IS OPPOSED TO 
USER FEES, AND THAT HE FEELS AS A GOVERNMENT AND COUNTRY, WE 
HAVE GONE OVERBOARD IN REGULATIONS AND ASSESSING FEES. 
UPON MOTION OF DR. JOHN SEVAN, THE 
BOARD VOTED TO ACCEFT THE 
RECOflMENDATIONS TO INSTITUTE USER 
FEES FOR RESTAURANT INSPECTIONS. 
MR. MC CLURE OPPOSED THE MOTION. 
CINDY GUST-JENSON ABSTAINED FROM. 
THE VOTE. 
SALT LAKE CITY-COUNTY HEALTH DEPARTMENT 
FOOD SERVICE/FOOD ESTABLISHMENT 
LICENSING FEE STANDARDS 
FINDING OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Salt Lake City-County Health Department Carries out responsibilities 
of food inspection in Salt Lake County. This authority is granted to 
the Salt Lake City-County Health Department by the Local Health Department 
Act of the Utah Code Annotated Title 26, Chapter 24. 
2. Section 26-24-14(14) allows local health departments to charge fees to 
carry out its responsibility. 
3. On September 10, 1986, a public hearing was held in order to receive 
public comment regarding the fees. Notice of the public hearing was 
advertised August 10 and 23, 1986, in the Salt Lake Tribune and Deseret 
News at'least 15 days prior to the public hearing. 
4. A summary of comments received at the public hearing was presented to 
the Board of Health at its regular scheduled Board of Health Meeting on 
October 2, 1986. 
5. While objection was raised by several individuals as to the charging 
of the fees, no information was brought forward which demonstrated that 
the proposed fees standard was contrary to state or local laws, was 
excessive, or not tied directly to the cost of the inspection program 
and to be used to support this cost. 
6. The Board finds that the proposed Food Inspection Fee Standard is 
consistent with the charging of fees in other Salt Lake City-County Health 
Department regulations such as the Asbestos Regulation, Massage Parlor 
Regulations, Swimming Pool Regulations, etc., and that the proposed fee 
does not single out food establishments in the charging of fees. 
7. The actual cost of the Food Inspection Program at the Salt Lake City-County 
He?lth Department is $453,000. Current fees for food handler permits total 
$25,000. Cost of the Food Inspection Program not covered by current fees 
totals $430,000. 
8. The proposed fee schedule will generate approximately $156,000, which is 
approximately one-third the total cost of the Food Inspection Program. 
9. Money collected by the proposed fee will be deposited in an account of 
the Health fund set up specifically to receivp monies generated by the 
proposed standard. 
10. Funding to support the Food Inspection Program will be drawn from the 
account mentioned above in Item #9. 
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The Salt Lake City-County Board of Health, therefore, concludes that 
the proposed food fees are reasonable and consistent with other fees 
charged by the Department, that proper procedures have been followed in 
developing the fees pursuant to Section 26-24-20, that the proposed fees 
will be used to support the Food Inspection Program, and that the fees are 
legal and meet the Intent of Section 26-24-14. Therefore, the Board adopts 
the fees standard as attached this 2nd day of October , 1986. 
L. OecTTionHson, M.D., Chairman 
Salt Lajce City-County Board of Health 
EXHIBIT "F" 
STAFF RESPONSE TO COMMENTS AT THE PUBLIC HEARING HELD 
SEPTEMBER 10, 1986 
This paper combines and summarizes the comments made at the 
hearing related to the proposed food service inspection fees and 





The food service industry is barely making a profit. 
This fee will cause a detrimental effect en profits and 
a loss of business and jobs. 
The staff was reas 
fee standard. The 
$100.00 per year f 
ments, which have 
square feet of flo 
figures to be. $1.3 
To be even more re 
fee would cost a f 
At the rates propo 
a significant detr 
jobs. 
onable in the amounts proposed for the 
maximum amount to be charged is 
or Category IV or Category V establish-
76 or more ieats or 5,COO or more 
or space. At the most, this amount 
2 per seat or two cents a square foot, 
alistic, we estimate that the annual 
raction of one cent per meal served. 
sed, we believe the fee will not be-
iment in lost profits, business or 
The purpose of the inspection is to protect the public; 
therefore, the burden of cost should be born by the 
public and the general tax. Tax increases should come 
from the regular budget process. 
It is true the purpose of the food service inspection 
is to protect the public but in this case, as it is in 
many other cases, it is not the general public that is 
causing the threat of foodborne illness. The -public1' 
creating the potential problem should carry primary 
responsibility to prevent it. We believe, however, sup-
port for the fee will ultimately come from the general 
public or customers of food establishments as the cost 
is passed on to them through the meals or food purchased, 
As James V. Olsen, President of that Utah Retail Grocers 
Association/ stated in his hearing comments, "...the 
businesses are forced to pass on these costs of doing 
business to their customers through higher prices". The 
cost that will be passed on will be minute. 
If it was the intent of the Utah State Legislature thru 
the Local Health Department Act Section 26-24-16 that 
only general tax dollars be the source of funding for 
local health departments, it appears they are creating 
a contradiction in Section 26-24-14(14). If Section 
26-24-14(14) was intended only for the establishment of 
fees where a direct benefit is received (e.g., fee for 
a birth certificate), it does not so state, and, if the 
WO' 
legislature decides to clarify this law and limit fees 
only to direct benefit, it will make it necessary for 
local health departments to shift the source .of funding 
to the property tax. If this shift causes an increase 
in property tax, the public would be opposed, even more 
so than the imposition of a fee. 
An editorial in the Salt Lake Tribune reflects the 
staff's point of view and we believe the point of view 
of the public. A copy is attached. 
All efforts to obtain a budget increase through the 
regular budget process have been exhausted, although we 
never dismiss this alternative in evaluating our pro-
grams. The County Commission feels they have received 
a clear public mandate that property taxes not be raised. 
ENT: A special group of businesses have been singled out, are 
required to be inspected and then are charged for the 
inspection. 
F RESPONSE; The current philosophy and intent of the County Com-
mission, where possible, is to have each program support 
itself. The trend not only in Salt Lake County and Utah, 
but nationwide is to have fees support each program and 
have these programs supported either by those being regu-
lated or those using the service. In establishing this 
basis, the food service industry is not being singled 
out. Permit or inspection fees have already been estab-
lished within the department for asbestos control, mas-
sage establishments, barber and beauty shops, swimming 
pools, solid waste haulers and facilities, septic tank 
inspections, and tattoo establishments. There is a fee 
schedule in the tanning facility regulations which is 
now going through the public comment process. Consis-
tency from the public point of view and the point of view 
of those already charged for a fee would dictate that 
the food industry should also assume part of the cost. 
:NT: Rather than impose a fee, the department should increase 
efficiency, be creative in effectiveness and tighten its 
belt. 
RESPONSE: The department has always and will continue to seek and 
adopt efficiencies prior to seeking budget increases. 
The department's reputation is clear that its budget sub-
mitted each year is a "bare bones" budget. In 1970, Salt 
Lake County's population was 480,152. In 1986, it has 
increased to over 700,000. Food establishments have 
increased 5-85 per year and now totals 3,000. The 
National Environmental Health Association recommends an 
average workload of 150 food establishments per sani-
tarian. Our workload is 250. 
With this remarkable increase in workload, the Food Pro-
tection Program has not had an increase in staff in the 
past 10 years. Rather, the excellence of the-program 
has been maintained through efficiencies and creative 
management. A number of efficiencies were.created with 
the computerized "SPIFM (Sanitation Program Information 
Formulator) Program. This program provides timely and 
meaningful data for each sanitarian. Food establishments 
that receive a low score receive greater attention and 
more frequent inspections, data is easily collected, 
tabulated and reported, inspection patterns and scores 
are readily available, and time sequences for reinspec-
tions are determined. Other efforts to "tighten our 
belt" have included cutting the inspection program for 
preschools and nursing homes and not picking up inspec-
tions of group homes, hourly day care facilities, 
extended care facilities and halfway houses. 
As an alternative to the department training all food 
handlers, a food establishment has the option of having 
its manager trained and the manager, in turn, training 
his employees. Unfortunately, few food establishments 
have implemented their own tralining program. 
Other agencies, both in and out of county government, 
have reviewed the department and its individual programs. 
Those reviews may be summed up in a statement in a March, 
1986, report by the Utah Foundation. It states, "Expen-
ditures of the Salt Lake City-fCounty Health Division in 
1984 appear significantly less than expenditures of 1974, 
if the 1974 figures are adjusted for inflation and the 
increased number of people served. Over the same period, 
health services appear to hav$ approximately doubled.". 
COMMENT: The fee is an unfair tax and tax increase. The food 
industry already pays taxes, license fees, and food 
handler permits to support the Food Protection budget. 
STAFF RESPONSE: The inspection fee is not a tax and it is not unfair or 
hidden. Authority to establish the fee is based on 
Section 26-24-14(14) of the Utah Code Annotated (Local 
Health Department Act). An individual often does not 
know what is included in his tax statement, where the 
taxes are going and how they are being spent. The food 
inspection fee on the other hand is a specific amount, 
the payer of the fee knows what it is for and should see 
a direct result. The fee is earmarked and can be spent 
for no other purpose. There is a specific accounting 
and auditing procedure set upj to handle the fee and 
determine its efficiency. 
Even though the food service industry pays other taxes, 
those taxes are not intended to cover the costs of the 
Health Department. License fees defray the cost of oth 
municipal and county agencies, but no license fee money 
goes to the Health Department. Food handler^permit fee 
are not paid by the food establishment. They are paid 
by the individual employee when he/she attends the clas 
COMMENT: Imposing this fee will set a precedent that other healtl 
departments will follow. Tried in Davis County and los 
STAFF RESPONSE: Imposing a permit or inspection fee to cover the costs 
of the department is not a new precedent. It has alreac 
been in practice several other programs within our 
Department and by other local health departments. Five 
local health departments, including Tooele County, Bear 
River District, Southeastern Health District, Wasatcn 
County and Utah County, have set fees. The fees we have 
set are comparable to those being proposed in these othe 
jurisdictions considering the size of the department and 
number of establishments in each jurisdiction. 
To say that the courts have ruled that a fee cannot be 
imposed because of the Davis County attempt is incorrect 
That attempt failed because specific legal procedures 
were not followed in establishing the fee. Fees can be 
imposed if the legal procedures are followed. The Utah 
State Supreme Court ruled that in promulgating a fee, 
standard findings of fact should be entered that are 
comprehensive enough to allow determination if the fees 
have been designed and collected to actually defray some 
or all of the costs of inspecting food service establish-
ments. The Board of Health and the staff are following 
these legal procedures. 
ZOMMENT: Once the fee is imposed, it will escalate and continue 
to increase. 
5TAFF RESPONSE: To assume the fee will not increase and to be a continuec 
source of helping defray inspection cost in unrealistic. 
However, it should be kept in mind that the Health 
Department's practice of not increasing fees has been 
outstanding. A case in point is the milk inspection fee 
which has not increased in the past 8 years. In setting 
food inspection fees, any subsequent increases will be 
by the Board of Health and not the staff. The Board has 
always been sensitive to the needs of those affected by 
the fee increase. 
Thursday Morning, September 23,1982 
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Food Service Inspection Fees 
Are Necessary Health Step 
In the area of public health 
protection, food service inspection 
should have top priority. There are 
more reported outbreaks of disease 
associated with food consumption 
than from all other environmental 
causes combined, according to the 
Utah State Health Department. 
But inspection staffs in the state's 
12 health districts historically have 
been grossly understaffed due to lack 
of funds. The result has been fewer 
inspections of public eating establish-
ments, sometimes only once a year 
rather than the legally-required once 
every six months, particularly in 
multi-county districts where great 
travel distances are involved. 
In a 1972 survey, 45 percent of the ' 
food service outlets in Utah were 
rated "inadequate" and, by law, 
could have been ordered closed for 
health reasons. A Bureau of Sanita-
tion survey just completed shows 
significant improvement overall, but 
restaurants scored worse than 
schools or taverns. 
The national formula for adequate 
health protection is one sanitarian 
per 15,000 population. On that basis, 
Utah is 41 sanitarians short. Davis 
County now has only five and should 
have 11. 
To help defray the cost of inspec-
tions and build up the program, Davis 
County Department of Health has 
taken a long-needed step of charging 
public food outlets a modest annual 
service fee. The Utah Restaurant 
Association is fighting the action, 
seeking a court injunction. 
The Davis County move stems from 
tightened state purse strings in recent 
years and follows a course outlined by 
the legislature. 
The burgeoning budget of the Utah 
Department of Health the past de-
cade, necesiitated by growing state 
and federal demands on it, was 
deeply slashed below requests the 
past two general sessions. So deeply 
the previous health director resigned 
in protest that the department's 
mandatory responsibilities could not 
be earned out with the reduced 
appropriations. It was a case of slash 
vital services and the public be 
damned or assess fees to maintain 
them. 
In response, the legislature in 19S1 
authorized the health department to 
charge for publications and services 
previously provided free. In protest-
ing the Davis County fees, the 
executive director of the restaurant 
association contends it was not the 
legislature's intent to include restaur-
ants in a fee system. But they are not 
exempted in the new law. It states 
broadly that "the department may 
adopt a schedule of fees that may be 
assessed for services rendered by the 
department, provided that such fees 
shall be reasonable and fair . . ." 
The Davis County schedule ap-
pears reasonable and fair, fees based 
on si2e and number of operating days 
annually, expected to cost each 
eating establishment between $15 
and $60 a year. That should impose no 
hardship on restaurant owners. 
There is| ample precedent in 
charging the private sector for public 
services their activities necessitate. 
Builders pay for septic tank inspec-
tions and other services. Industry 
pays for health department review of 
pollution control plans. The dairy 
business pays inspection fees. 
,The new restaurant fees are an 
appropiate investment in public 
health. The inspection program is 
essential and should be brought up to 
full strength rather than drift ir*:o 
neglect through lack of money. 
SALT LAKE CITY-COUNTY BOARD OF HEALTH MEETING 
AUDITORIUM, SALT LAKE CITY-COUNTY HEALTH DEPARTMENT 
610 SOUTH 200 EAST 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
JUNE 5, 19B6 - 7:30 A.M. 
PRESENT: STAFF: 
L. Jed Morrison, M. 
Chai m a n 
John M. Bevan, D.D. 
Richard Bollard 
Janet R. Green 
Linda Hamilton 
Cindy Gust-Jenson 
Paul W. McClure 
R. Todd Neilson 
Craig E. Peterson 
Rulon Simfions, M.D. 




Harry L. Gibbons, M.D, 
Kent Fitzgerald 
Terry Sadler 
Wi11iaa L. Davis 
Jeff Throckaorton 




























Upon aotion of Douglas H. Snath, 
seconded by Richard Bollard, the 
Minutes for the aeeting held May 1, 
19B6, were unaniaously approved. 
A certificate and Resolution were presented to Janet R. Green for 
her contributions to the Board during the tiee she served. Mrs. 
Green is Moving out of state. 
-3-
b e m q regulated by State and Federal Law, and the companies already comply with 
those regulations. Mr, Bird complimented the Board in their efforts in 
developing the Regulations. 
Upon action of Richard Bollard, seconded 
by Douglas Smith, the Board unanimously 
voted to accept the proposed changes and 
adopt Asbestos Regulations. Staff will 
be required to present an annual report 






Terry Sadler reported that a few years ago restaurant fees were 
discussed, but no action Mas taken because Utah Restaurant 
Association filed a lawsuit. The District Court suit was 
appealed to the Utah Supreme Court, and a ruling was handed down 
that Davis County did not follow protocol with their public 
hearing. The court did not rule on fees. California, Nevada 
and Texas, as well as other states, already charge fees. Mr. 
Sadler circulated an information sheet which listed various 
categories, definitions, and respective fees for the named 
categories. 
Staff met with Mr. Ron Morgan of Utah Restaurant Association and 
Mr. Jim Olson of Utah Retail Grocers Association to discuss a 
user fee. Every food establishment that is inspected should be 
charged a reasonable fee. Mr. Sadler estimated cost of food 
inspections to be approximately $600,000. Health presently 
generates approximately $50,000, but it is anticipated that 
$150,000 could be generated if collection of fees were to be 
instituted. Dr. John Bevan stated he felt inspections of food 
establishments was very appropriate and that a fee should be 
charged. 
Upon motion of Dr. John Bevan, 
seconded by Jan Green, the Board 
unanimously voted to approve a public 
hearing for restaurant inspection fees. 
Inspection of food dispensed through vending machines was also 
discussed. Those foods are inspected at the packaging site. 
Douglas Smith inquired about food handling and sanitation in 
those instances where corporations, partnerships and companies 
invite clients to their establishment and serve food, but are 
not really set up to handle groups. Is dishwashing adequate, and 
is sanitation by those handling the food adequate? He feels 
these establishments should also be subject to food inspections. 
Dr. Gibbons stated this would be a matter for future 
consideration by the Food Division .r 
F
" Kent Fitzgerald circulated information relating tc proposed 
Increases increases in fees. The information included • description of the 
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Dear Board Member: 
On Wednesday, September 10, 1986, we held a public hearing 
and completed a 30-day comment period on the Proposed Food Estab-
lishment Inspection Fees, I am enclosing, for your review, the 
following: 
1. A copy of the proposed Fee Standards. 
2. Minutes of the public hearing (copies of the written comments 
submitted at the hearing are available upon request). 
3. A draft copy of the conclusions of law and findings of fact 
that are necessary as part of the rule-making process. 
4. An outline of the issues raised by those making comments 
and staff response to those comments. 
The impression I received from some of the comments leads 
me to believe that there are many individuals who do not under-
stand the great effort we have made to maintain an efficient and 
effective food protection program, including the efforts our 
Fiscal Committee who reviews our programs, sets priorities and 
insure tax dollars are spent wisely. 
We can be proud of our Food Protection Program. It serves 
a vital public health need in Salt Lake County and has been an 
exemplary program, not only for Utah, but is so recognized in 
many areas of the United States. Filling the existing need has 
not been easy. We have maintained excellence, but we feel we 
have economized to the point public health may be jeopardized. 
We have not had an increase in food protection staff in the past 
10 years, yet today we inspect 3,000 food establishments compared 
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to 2,000 that existed 12 years ago. The past few years we have 
been experiencing a 5-8% growth rate in establishments, not 
taking into account the increase and workload created by tempo-
rary events such as the Utah Arts Festival, neighborhood fairs, 
holiday parades and celebrations and other mass gatherings. 
During the 1970*s, 30C of every food dollar spent was in a food 
establishment. During the 1980*5 this figure has risen to 40C 
and by 1990 is expected to rise to 50C. Last year, because of 
improper food handling at a single event, there was a confirmed 
foodborne illness affecting 300 people. The threat of foodborne 
illness is ever present. 
Our efforts as a health department to economize and become 
more efficient will continue. As I have stated in recent Board 
Meetings, however, I strongly feel the need for this inspection 
fee to be adopted so the maintenance of an excellent program may 
continue. Please review the enclosed documents carefully. If 






G a r y E. A t k i n , E s q . 
A t t o r n e y s f o r P l a i n t i f f s 
185 S o u t h S t a t e S t r e e t , S u i t e 400 
S a l t L a k e C i t y , U t a h 8 4 1 1 1 
T e l e p h o n e : ( 8 0 1 ) 5 2 1 - 2 5 52 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH RESTAURANT ASSOCIATION, 
a U t a h n o n - p r o f i t c o r p o r a t i o n , 
e t a l . , FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
P l a i n t i t f s , 
C i v i l No. C86-9U24 
v . (JUDGE MOFFAT) 
SALT LAKE CITY-COUNTY 
BOARD OF HEALTH, 
D e f e n d a n t . 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing 
before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable Richard H. Moffat, 
Judge, presiding; and plaintiffs being represented by their 
counsel, Gary E. Atkin, Esq., and defendant being represented by 
its counsel, Thomas L. Christensen, Esq., Deputy Salt Lake County 
Attorney; and the parties having submitted the matter to the 
Court upon a Stipulation of Facts and Issues for Determination; 
both parties having submitted their Memoranda of Points and 
Authorities and Reply Memoranda in support of their respective 
positions; and the matter having been fully argued to the Court; 
and the Court having reviewed the Memoranda, as well as the 
pleadings, affidavits, Stipulation of Facts and Issues, and otlier 
'W-
documents filed of record; and the Court now being fully informed 
in the premises, does hereby make and enter the following: 
FINDINGS OF FkCT 
1. Plaintiff associations, the Utal) Restaurant Association, 
Utah Retail Grocer's Association, and Utah Hotel-Motel 
Association, are non-profit corporations, duly organized and 
existing under the laws of the State of Utah, with their 
principal places of business in Salt Lake County, and whose 
memberships are composed of persons, corporations, partnerships, 
and other entities engaged in, associated with, or having a 
direct interest in the restaurant and food service industry in 
the state of Utah, whose memberships includes numerous persons 
whose businesses are operated within Salt Lake County, and which 
are subject to the "Food Service/Food Establishment Licensing 
Fee Standards'* (the " fee standard") involved m this action. 
Each of those associations is a person within the meaning of 
Utah's Declaratory Judgment Act, Section? 78-33-1, et seq., Utah 
Code Anno. (1953), as amended, and Utah's Administrative 
Rulemaking Act, Section 63-46a-l, et seq., Utah Code Anno. 
(1953), as amended. Each plaintiff is entitled to the relief 
sought under those Acts. 
2. The remaining plaintiffs are also persons subject to, 
and whose legal relations are affected by, the fee standard and 
are persons within the meaning of the Declaratory Judgment Act, 
Sections 78-33-1, et seq., Utah Code Anno, (1953)# as amended, as 
2 
well as within the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, Section 
63-46a-l, et seq., Utah Code Anno, (1953), as amended. 
3- The Salt Lake City-County Board of Health (the "Board") 
is a non-elected body, appointed by the Salt Lake City and County 
Commissioners to act as a local board of health pursuant to the 
provisions of Sections 26-24-1, et seq., Utah Code Anno. (1953), 
as amended, which provisions specify the statutory powers and 
duties of the Board. 
4. The Board, as a separate body, is amenable to suit and 
is subject to the jurisdiction and process of this Court, 
pursuant to Sections 63-46a-13, Utah Code Anno. (1953), as 
amended, and Section 78-33-1, et seq., Utah Code Anno. (1953), as 
amended. 
5. This is an action brought by plaintiffs pursuant to the 
provisions of the aforesaid Sections and Rule 57, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, for a declaratory judgment to determine the 
validity and constitutionality of the "Food Service/Food 
Establishment Licensing Fee Standards" adopted by the Board. 
6. The exhibits attached to the Stipulation of the parties, 
as subsequently supplemented by the parties, reflect all meetings 
of the Board relative to the fee standard and the times, places 
anu purposes ot those meetings, as well as all actions taken, 
comments made, and other input presented at those meetings, and 
all notices thereof, which were considered in the formulation of 
the Board's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law relative to 
the adoption of the fee standard. 
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7. Except as referred to in Paragraph 6, there are no other 
items of testimony, documents, papers, Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, or Orders ot the Board regarding the proposal 
and adoption of the tee standard. 
8. The inspections contemplated in the fee standara 
constitute no change trom the inspections previously conducted, 
except that previous inspections were paid with Health Department 
funds. 
9. Fees collected by defendant pursuant to the fee standard 
have not been expended but have been deposited into a Health 
Department fund and are rerlected, for bookkeeping purposes, as a 
credit to a separate discretionary Health Department account, 
which does not reflect deposits from any other source. Defendant 
intended that this account would be used to pay for a portion of 
the food inspection program or, if the court should so direct, to 
provide a refund to the persons making the payments. 
10. The dollar amounts, categories and detinitions applied 
in the "Food Service/Food Establishment Licensing Fee Standards11 
were prepared and adopted based upon recommendations ot the 
Health Department staff. The Board made its determination, based 
upon the recommendations of staff and its own deliDerations, that 
the dollar amounts, categories and definitions were reasonable. 
There was no public input regarding those dollar amounts, 
categories and definitions. 
4 
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11. There are no existing genuine issues as to any material 
fact relevant to this action which would require an evidentiary 
hearing. 
BASED UPON the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court does 
hereby make and order the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendant does not have the authority to impose charges 
as specified in the "Food Service/Food Establishment Licensing 
Fee Standards'1 for food service establishments pursuant to the 
provisions of Section 26-24-1, et seq., Utah Code Anno. (1953), 
or otherwise. Section 26-24-14 (14), Utah Code Anno. (1953) 
refers only to the charging of fees for such minor items as 
preparing certificates, copying fees, and similar fees for 
specific services to particular persons for their specific 
benefit, such as have been traditionally imposed by governmental 
bodies. The statute does not authorize defendant to attempt to 
offset substantial portions of its total costs, including 
salaries and overhead involved in particular programs, through 
the imposition of such charges. Therefore, since defendant was 
acting in excess of its statutory authority in attempting to 
impose those charges, they should be declared to be invalid, and 
null and void ab initio. 
2. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as adopted 
by defendant are unsupported by the evidence presented at the 
public hearing of September 10, 1986, relative to the adoption of 
its "Food Service/Food Establishment Licensing Fee Standards" for 
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food service establishments. While the Court recognizes that 
defendant is not bound by the evidence presented at such public 
hearings, the Findings of Fact mandated by Section 26-24-1, et 
seq., Utah Code Annotated (1953), should have some support in the 
evidence so presented. Therefore, the standard imposing the 
charges should be declared invalid, and r^ ull and void ab initio. 
3. The provisions of the "Food Service/Food Establishment 
Licensing Fee Standards" amount to a tax. The Board is not 
authorized to levy taxes and, therefore, the standard should be 
declared to be invalid, and null and void ab initio. 
4. Any charges previously collected by defendant based upon 
the "Food Service/Food Establishment Licensing Fee Standards" 
were improperly assessed and should be returned to plaintiffs and 
others paying the same. 
5. Defendant should be restrained! from assessing further 
charges pursuant to the "Food Ser\f ice/Food Establishment 
Licensing Fee Standards^^ 
Dated this // day 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Counsel for Defendant 
De«ii'iy C!e^* 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a copy of the 
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the office 
of Thomas L. Christensen, Deputy County Attorney, County Complex, 
2100 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84105, this 3rd 




Gary E. A t k i n , E s q . 
A t t o r n e y s f o r P l a i n t i f f s 
165 S o u t h S t a t e S t r e e t , S u i t e 400 
S a l t Lake C i t y , U t a h 8 4 1 1 1 
T e l e p h o n e : ( 8 0 1 ) 5 2 1 - 2 5 5 2 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
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P l a i n t i f f s , 
v • 
SALT LAKE CITY-COUNTY 
BOARD OF HEALTH, 
Defendant. 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing 
before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable Richard H. Moffat, 
Judge, presiding; and plaintiffs being represented by their 
counsel, Gary E. Atkin, Esq., and defendant being represented by 
its counsel, Thomas L. Christensen, Esq,, Deputy Salt Lake County 
Attorney; and the parties having submitted the matter to the 
Court upon a Stipulation of Facts and fssues for Determination; 
and both parties having submitted their Memoranda of Points and 
Authorities and Reply Memoranda in support of their respective 
positions; and the matter having been argued to the Court; and 
the Court having reviewed said Memoranda, as well as the 
pleadings, affidavits, Stipulation of Facts and Issues and other 
K-^ ACU-O^ \;i 
C i v i l No. C 8 6 - 9 0 2 4 
(JUDGE MOFFAT) 
(H;!>'!;' 
documents filed of record: and the Court having heretofore made 
and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of La~; ana the 
Court being fully informed in the premises, now, therefore: 
IT IS HERE3Y ORDERED that the " Fooa Service/Food 
Establishment Licensing Fee Standards" adopted by defendant are 
declared invalid, and null and void ab initio. 
IT IS FuRTHER ORDERED that defendant be, ana heresy is, 
restrained from attempting to impose any further charges pursuant 
to the "Food Service/Food Establishment Licensing Fee Standards". 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant be, and hereby is, 
ordered to refund and return any payments previously received 
from any of the plaintiffs pursuant to the "Food Service/Food 
Establishment Licensir^ Fee Standards" 
Dated t h i s day of fl<A^VT 1987 
B 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Counsel for Derenaant 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLEV 
CLERK 
Oepti ly C-ifctrk 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a copy of the 
foregoing Judgment to the office of Thomas L. Christensen, Deputy 
County Attorney, County Complex, 2100 South State Street, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84105, this 3rd day of August, 1987. 
A'/sj, • y 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Utah Restaurant Association, a 
Utah non-profit corporation; Utah 
Retail Grocers Association, a Utah 
non-profit corporation; Lamb's 
Restaurant; Flying Dees Family 
Restaurants; Kentucky Fried 
Chicken-Harmon's Management Corp.; 
Gastronomy, Inc.; Taco Maker, Inc.; 
Market Street Grill; Market Street 
Broiler; New Yorker Restaurant; 
Hilton Hotels-Pearson Enterprises; 
Sizzling Platter, Inc.; Stan's 
Market; N.P.S.; Crystal Palace 
Market; Wheel-In Market; The Table 
Supply; Voyles Market; The Store; 
Albertson's, Inc.; Family Market; 
Safeway Stores, Inc.; Tanning 
Experience; O.P. Skaggs #1; SAB 
Enterprises; 8th Avenue Meat & 
Grocery; Macey's, Inc.; Bell's 48th 
St. Market; Peterson Foodtown; 
Food-4-Less; Dan's Foods; Montie's 
Bestway; and Hale's Market, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v. 
Salt Lake City-County Board of 
Health, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 870420-CA 
F I L E D 
MaryT Noonan 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeats 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Richard H. Moffat 
Attorneys: David E. Yocom, Thomas L. Christensen, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellant 
Gary E. Atkin, Salt Lake City, for Respondents 
Before Judges Davidson, Bench, and Jacksdn. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
The Salt Lake City-County Board of Health (the -Board"), 
seeks reversal of a declaratory judgment holding its food 
service establishment inspection fee regulation, adopted under 
the Local Health Department Act (the "Act"),1 legally 
invalid. We reverse. 
The Board is a non-elected body appointed by the Salt Lake 
City and County Commissioners to act as a local board of 
health. Its powers and duties are set forth in the Act. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-24-14 (1984). At a June 1986 meeting, the 
Board discussed reviving a plan to initiate an inspection fee to 
be paid by "food service/food establishment" businesses. Staff 
members presented information about inspection fee 
classifications and schedules in several nearby states and 
estimated the health department was spending $600,000 to inspect 
food establishments at least twice yearly as required by Utah 
State Food Service Regulations. The Board voted to hold a 
public hearing on the inspection fee proposal. A fee schedule 
(referred to as the "fee standard") was drafted, listing 
categories of food establishments and setting annual inspection 
fees that ranged from $40 to $100, depending on the number of 
service bays, or the number of seats, or square footage. The 
dollar amounts, categories, and definitions in the proposed 
standard were prepared and adopted based upon recommendations of 
the department's staff and the Board's deliberations. 
After publication of notice in local newspapers and a 
thirty-day period for public comment, during which copies of the 
proposed fee schedule and regulation were made available to the 
public, a public hearing was held on September 10, 1986, at 
which approximately 30-40 people submitted oral and written 
comments. There was no testimony or written evidence submitted 
at this public hearing showing the basis for the food 
establishment categories or fee amounts set forth in the 
proposed inspection fee schedule. Health department staff 
prepared a document summarizing and responding to the criticisms 
of the proposed schedule made at the public hearing. The Board 
also prepared a draft of its findings of fact, conclusions of 
law, and order, required by Utah Code Ann. § 26-24-20(3) (1984) 
as part of the rulemaking process. See Utah Restaurant Ass'n v. 
Davis County Bd. of Health, 709 P.2d 1159 (Utah 1985). 
1. Utah Code Ann. §§ 26-24-1 through -24 (1984). 
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At its October 2, 1986, meeting, Board members again 
discussed the fee schedule among themselves and heard 
additional input from representatives of affected food 
establishments. The Board then voted to institute the fee 
program and adopted the prepared findings, conclusions, and 
order, in which it found there was no information put forth by 
critics demonstrating that the proposed fee was either 
unlawful, excessive, not tied directly to the cost of the 
inspection program ($453,000), or not to be used solely to 
support that program. It also specifically found that the 
proposed fees were reasonable and that they would raise 
$156,000, approximately one-third of the annual cost of the 
inspection program. With regard to the use of the new fees, 
the Board stated: 
9. Money collected by the proposed fee 
will be deposited in an account of the 
Health fund set up specifically to receive 
monies generated by the proposed standard. 
10. Funding to support the Food 
Inspection Program will be drawn from the 
account mentioned above in Item #9. 
The respondents subsequently filed this declaratory 
judgment action2 to challenge the fee regulation's 
constitutionality and validity. After the parties stipulated 
to undisputed facts regarding the sequence of events and the 
basis for the Board's findings and conclusions, three issues 
were submitted for determination on cross-motions for summary 
judgment and ruled on.3 
2. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-33-1 through -13 (1987). £&£ Utah 
Restaurant Ass'n v. Davis County Bd. of Health, 709 P.2d 1159, 
1161 (Utah 1985) (rules of county board of health constitute 
"municipal ordinance" whose construction or validity can be 
challenged in a declaratory judgment action). 
3. The respondents also contended the Board had not complied 
with the statutory procedural requirements in imposing the 
fees, presumably for unarticulated reasons other than the lack 
of evidence at the hearing to support the findings and fee 
schedule. However, the trial court did not rule on this as a 
separate issue, and it has not been raised in this appeal. 
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The trial court held the fee regulation invalid and void ab 
initio on each of the asserted grounds: (1) the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law adopted by the Board on October 2, 
1986, are not supported by evidence presented at the public 
hearing held September 10, 1986, contrary to the requirements of 
the Act; (2) despite its label, the inspection "fee" is invalid 
because it constitutes a tax, which the Board is not statutorily 
authorized to levy; and (3) even if it is not a tax, the Act 
does not authorize the Board to impose fees in the form of 
charges on food establishments to defray the costs of the food 
establishment inspection program. 
The Board contends the trial court erred on all three 
points. On appeal, we do not defer to the trial courtfs rulings 
on these questions of law. Instead, we review them under a 
correction of error standard. E.g., Creer v. Valley Bank & 
Trust Co,, 97 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (Dec. 9, 1588); Western Kane 
County Spec. Serv. Distr. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co.. 744 P.2d 
1376 (Utah 1987). 
VALIDITY OF BOARD FINDINGS 
Section 26-24-20(1) of the Act gives the Board authority to 
enact rules, regulations, or standards "necessary for the 
promotion of public health . . . and the prevention of outbreaks 
and spread of communicable and infectious diseases. • . ." 
However, the Board is required to provide public hearings prior 
to any such enactment. See Utah Code Ann. § 26-24-20(2) 
(1984). Subsection (3) states: 
The hearings may be conducted by the board 
at a regular or special meeting, or the 
board may appoint hearing officers, who 
shall have power and authority to conduct 
hearings in the name of the board at a 
designated time and place. A record or 
summary of the proceedings of any hearing 
shall be taken and filed with the board, 
together with findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and the order of the 
board or hearing officer. In any hearing, 
a member of the board or the hearing 
officer shall have power to administer 
oaths, examine witnesses, and issue notice 
of the hearings or subpoenas in the name 
of the board requiring the testimony of 
witnesses and the production of evidence 
relevant to any matter in the hearing. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 26-24-20(3) (1984). Respondents do not assert 
a complete lack of any basis for the proposed fee schedule. 
Instead, respondents contend this section of the Act requires 
the findings of the Board to be supported by at least some 
evidence introduced at the required public hearing "or the 
mandate for a public hearing is worthless." The parties agree 
that the Board's fee standards were prepared on the basis of 
information provided by health department staff to the Board 
before the public hearing and not on the basis of evidence 
submitted SLL the public hearing. Therefore, respondents argue, 
the findings and the fee schedule are invalid. 
In effect, respondents contend that the public hearing 
mandated by the Act during rulemaking is a trial-type hearing. 
They claim they were not fully informed of the information 
submitted to and considered by the Board; they complain they 
did not have the opportunity to offer rebuttal evidence or 
cross-examine everyone submitting information to the Board. 
Those are the main elements of a trial. The trial court 
accepted this argument and held that the statute limited the 
rulemaking process to consideration of "evidence" presented at 
the September 10, 1986, public hearing. We conclude this is an 
erroneous interpretation of the statute's requirements. 
An inspection fee adopted by a local board of health was 
also at issue in Utah Restaurant Association v. Davis County 
Board of Health, in which the fee standard was invalidated 
because the board had failed to comply with the statutory 
requirement that findings of fact and conclusions of law be 
filed. In thus applying the clear letter of the law, the court 
noted that such a requirement is normally associated only with 
the adjudication of a claim# not with rule promulgation. Id. 
709 P.2d at 1164. 
In interpreting this provision of the Act/ the Utah Supreme 
Court clarified that subsections (1) through (3) of section 
26-24-20 delineate the steps which a local board must follow in 
its rulemaking process. Jfl. at 1161. In contrast/ subsections 
(4) through (6) of the same section apply to enforcement 
actions by a local health department. 2&. It is apparent 
that, despite the use of terms normally employed in a trial 
context, subsections (1) through (3) create a "notice and 
comment" public hearing rulemaking process, not a trial-type 
procedure. 
There is no question that notice and opportunity to be 
heard were provided to the public in accordance with the 
statute. It is also apparent respondents had a full and fair 
opportunity to present evidence to the Board supporting their 
claims that the fee is unnecessary and burdensome and that the 
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fee schedule is unreasonable in the way it categorizes food 
establishments. The text of the proposed fee schedule, drafted 
based on information provided to the Board by its staff, was 
made available to the public during the comment period. The 
public hearing was conducted by a health department staff 
member as hearing officer, and three other representatives of 
the department were present. Oral statements and written 
comments were received from various organizations and 
individuals, including many of the respondents and their legal 
counsel. Attendees were informed that a summary of the hearing 
and written comments would be submitted to the Board before its 
regular meeting on October 2, 1986, and that interested parties 
could attend that meeting and make additional comments. The 
Board's staff prepared and submitted written responses to the 
comments made at the September public hearing. Representatives 
of the respondents and their legal counsel appeared at the 
October 2 meeting and made further arguments to the Board prior 
to its final adoption of findings, conclusions of law, and an 
order approving the fee regulation. 
The foregoing process comports with the procedure 
prescribed in the statute. Further, the Board's procedures 
were in accord with the purpose of a public rulemaking hearing, 
i.e., to afford interested persons an opportunity to submit 
written data, views, and arguments regarding why the proposed 
regulation should or should not be adopted. £££ Colorado Auto 
& Truck Wreckers Ass'n v. Department of Revenue. 618 P.2d 646, 
652 (Colo. 1980) (in which the statute described the purpose of 
the mandatory public hearing in these terftts). 
Hearings in administrative rulemaking 
procedure are usually either investigatory 
or designed to permit persons who may not 
have been reached in a previous process of 
consultation and conference to come 
forward with evidence or opinion. The 
purpose is not to try a case, but to 
enlighten the administrative agency, and 
to protect private interests against 
uninformed and unwise action. 
2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrative Law § 283 (1$62). 
Section 26-24-20(3) cannot properly fye said to require an 
adversarial, trial-type hearing when ther^ is no requirement that 
the Board's rulemaking be based solely on a trial-type 
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record.4 The statute does not say evidence must be produced at 
the hearing and upon such evidence the Board shall make written 
findings. Although the statute authorizes the Board or its 
hearing officer to take testimony and compel witnesses to attend 
or produce relevant "evidence" at the public hearing, it does not 
say the Board shall act only on the basis of such "evidence" or 
the record compiled exclusively at the public hearing. In 
addition contrary to the trial court's reading of the statute, 
it imposes no affirmative duty on the Board to submit evidence at 
the public hearing in support of its own proposed fee 
regulation. See Long v. Department of Nat. Res., 118 Ohio App. 
369, 195 N.E.2d 128 (1963). 
In short, although the Board must consider all material 
presented to it during the public comment period and at the 
public hearing that is relevant to a proposed rule or regulation, 
the Act does not restrict it to acting only on such data or 
testimony when finally adopting rules or regulations. See State 
v. Hebert, 743 P.2d 392# 397 (Alaska App. 1987); International 
Council of Shopping Centers v. Oregon Envtl. Quality Comm'n, 27 
Or. App. 321# 556 P.2d 138 (1976). It may rely on its own 
experience, its expertise, and any facts known to it from 
whatever source they are drawn. See 1 K. Davis, Administrative 
Law Treatise § 6.17 (2d ed. 1978); see also International Council 
of Shopping Centers, 566 P.2d at 141 (agency involved in informal 
4. 
Trial procedure is inappropriate on 
nonfactual issues, on issues of law or 
policy# and on issues of broad legislative 
fact. Trial procedure is especially 
inappropriate for untangling jumbles of 
policy, law/ discretion/ and legislative 
fact. The reason for not using trial 
procedure is that such procedure is not 
intrinsically designed for nonfactual 
issues; much administrative experience 
proves that trial procedure to resolve 
issues other than issues of adjudicative 
fact or specific legislative fact is 
wasteful, cumbersome, expensive, and 
unhelpful. No trial judge would use trial 
procedure to resolve a nonfactual issue. 
Neither should an agency. 
3 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 14.3 (2d ed. 1980). 
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rulemaking can properly rely on data gathered from publications 
in its field, interviews/ input from advisory committees/ or even 
information informally obtained). It follows that adverse public 
input/ once considered by the Board/ may be disregarded even if 
unrebutted by testimony or evidence presented at the public 
hearing. See Colorado Auto & Truck Wreckers Ass'n, 618 P.2d at 
652. 
The trial court erred in holding the Board's findings of 
fact and conclusions of law invalid under the Act. 
AUTHORIZATION TO IMPOSE FEES 
A local board of health has no inherent power to charge fees 
or levy taxes of any kind. Utah Restaurant Ass'n v. Davis County 
Bd, of Health, 709 P.2d at 1163-64. "Any such authority must be 
conferred on it by the county which created it# acting within its 
lawful authority, or by the legislature." I&. at 1164. In this 
case# the Board contends it is authorized to impose an inspection 
fee under its statutory grant of powers. In ruling that the 
inspection fee constituted either an impermissible tax or an 
unauthorized fee, the trial court focused only on section 
26-24-14(14) of the Act, which gives a lqcal health department 
authority to 
establish and collect appropriate fees, to 
accept, use and administer all federal, 
state, or private donations or grants of 
funds/ property, services, or materials 
for public health purposes, and to make 
such, agreements, not inconsistent with 
law/ as may be required as a condition to 
receiving such donation or grant[.] 
The trial court concluded this provision does not authorize 
the Board to offset a portion of the costs involved in 
particular programs through the imposition of fees for that 
program. According to the trial court, the term "fees" in this 
section refers only to charges for "such frinor items as 
preparing certificates, copying fees, and similar fees for 
specific services to particular persons for their specific 
benefit . . . ." We do not agree. 
The term -fees" is used three times in the Local Health 
Department Act. In addition to section 26-24-14(14), section 
26-24-15(1) provides for apportionment of I the local health 
department costs among participating counties and 
municipalities and states that "money available from fees, 
contracts, surpluses, grants, and donations may be used to 
establish and maintain local health departments." Moneys 
received from these sources, including "fees . . . for local 
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health purposes, "are credited to a health department fund 
which must be expended only for maintenance and operation of 
the local health department. Utah Code Ann* § 26-24-18 (1984). 
In all three sections of the Act, fees are grouped with 
several other means of providing funds for establishing, 
maintaining, and operating a local health department, including 
its various programs designed to promote and protect public 
health. There is not the slightest hint that the legislature 
intended to restrictively define "fees" as involving only 
minimal charges for clerical or ministerial services.5 We 
therefore conclude that a charge imposed by a local board on 
health department program participants to defray the costs of 
the program is a "fee" within the purview of the Act. 
FEE OR TAX? 
Whether or not the particular food establishment inspection 
fee regulation adopted by the Board is a "tax," not authorized 
by the Act, turns on the actual purpose for its adoption. See 
Utah Restaurant Ass'n, 709 P.2d at 1164. 
If the money collected is for a license to 
engage in a business and the proceeds 
therefrom are purposed mainly to service, 
regulate and police such business or 
activity, it is regarded as a license 
fee. On the other hand, if the factors 
just stated are minimal, and the money 
collected is mainly for raising revenue 
for general municipal purposes, it is 
properly regarded as the imposition of a 
tax, and this is so regardless of the 
terms used to describe it. 
wgfrer Pasig Hgrpe PvUders Ass'n vt Roy City* 26 Utah 2d 215, 487 
P.2d 866, 867 (1971) (footnote omitted). See Provo Citv v, Provo 
Meat & Packing Co., 49 Utah 528, 165 P. 477, 479 (1917) 
(municipality may charge meat sellers fees to cover costs of 
inspection and policing of meat sales). 
5. The record before the Board shows that other fees are 
regularly charged by the health department to offset the costs 
of mandatory immunizations, as well as for inspections under 
the asbestos and solid waste programs. 
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In Utah Restaurant Association, which involved a similar 
inspection fee regulation adopted by a local board of health, 
the food establishments also claimed the fee was invalid as a 
tax. The Utah Supreme Court did not need to reach this issue, 
however, because the regulation was invalidated on the 
alternative basis, noted above, i.e., tl^ e board's failure to 
file the requisite findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
Utah Restaurant Ass'n, 709 P.2d at 1164. Nonetheless, the 
court proceeded to issue an advisory opinion describing factual 
findings by the board that would provide information supporting 
a conclusion that its charge for inspecting food establishments 
was a valid fee instead of a tax. See id. First, has the 
regulation been designed to actually defray some or all of the 
costs of inspecting the food service establishments on which it 
is imposed? Second, is there some assurance that the money 
collected will actually be used to defray those costs? With 
adequate answers to these questions, a reviewing court can more 
easily determine the true nature of the enactment, see id.., and 
make the distinction drawn in Weber Basin Home Builders 
Association, supra-
Here, the record demonstrates the Board acted to comply 
with the advice in Utah Restaurant Association when it adopted 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Board 
specifically found the actual cost of the food establishment 
inspection program to be $453,000, of which only $156,000 would 
be paid for by the proposed fees. The balance was to be raised 
through food handler permits and general taxes. The Board's 
findings, conclusions, and order require the collected 
inspection fees to be deposited in a special account, to be 
drawn upon to support the food establishment inspection 
program. Furthermore, the record before the Board clearly 
shows that the inspection fees were earmarked for the 
inspection program and could be spent for no other purpose, a 
fact reiterated before the district court in the unrefuted 
affidavit of a deputy county auditor. Respondents did not 
submit any controverting evidence or information on these 
matters to the Board or to the trial court. 
In light of the purpose of the inspection fee program, its 
partial funding by fees imposed on the inspected food 
establishments, and the restricted use of the collected fees, 
we conclude the inspection fee regulation adopted by the Board 
was not invalid as an unauthorized tax. The trial court's 
ruling to the contrary was in error. 
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The judgment of the trial court is reversed. 
Norman H. Jacks^ fi, Judge 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
^ %Ut^J^ 
Russell w. Bench, Judge 
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